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This thesis focuses on the issues related to the reporting and the management of risk 
in the banking sector, with specific reference to the Italian context. The thesis is 
oriented towards a deeper understanding on these issues, with especial attention to 
the importance of “to be compliant” with current regulation. In particular, the issues 
outlined above are addressed through the adoption of multiple theoretical and 
methodological perspectives, in order to progressively engage with the field of interest. 
For the purposes of the analysis, a conceptual premise is due. Indeed, any study 
about risk disclosure and risk management requires ‘risk’ to be defined. In 
everyday language ‘risk’ is used very broadly; for example in lieu of hazard, threat 
or harm (Lupton, 1999). Specifically, finance literature typically defines risk as 
“quantifiable uncertainty” (Miller and Power, 1992; March and Shapira, 1987), 
measurable in its own amount, which incorporates the probability of loss. In other 
words, some authors define “risk” as referring to a set of outcomes arising from a 
decision that can be assigned probabilities whereas “uncertainty” arises when 
probabilities cannot be assigned to the set of outcomes (Watson and Head, 1998). 
These definitions of risk and uncertainty reflect events that have occurred during 
the modern era (Reddy, 1996). Pre-modern ideas of risk were connected to the 
occurrence of natural events, for example hurricanes (Lupton, 1999). The 
development of probability calculations and the insurance industry during the 
industrial revolution impacted upon ideas of risk. The chances of outcomes then 
became susceptible to mathematical calculations and compensation could be paid 
out when a negative outcome occurred (Miller and Power, 1992, Ewald, 1991). 
Recent literature has shown how the concept of risk, intended as quantifiable and 
measurable, has evolved in uncertainty (Mikes 2011; Power, 2009), defined as the 
unpredictability of environmental or organizational variables that impact on 
corporate performance. Thus, the focus shifts from a concept of unpredictability of 
economic and financial results to a broader concept of unpredictability, related to 
the external and internal variables influencing the overall corporate performance. 
In order to give information useful to decision makers, all these aspects of risks, 
intended as non-financial, need to be adequately disclosed and managed. 
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The concepts of risk reporting and risk management have received considerable 
attention in recent years (Miihkinen 2013, Miihkinen 2012; Oliveira et al. 2011, 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Power, 2004). Indeed, it is worth noting that most of the 
studies on risk disclosure have mainly focused on non-financial companies risk 
disclosure provided by banks is still relatively under-researched (Oliveira et al. 2011).  
It is worth noting that financial firms are risk management entities, as their core 
business is to take risks and to provide liquidity. Therefore, banking companies can 
be expected to divulge significantly different types of risk disclosure (Bessis, 
2002). Also, risk disclosure is raised to a particular level of importance within 
banking organizations in comparison with non-financial firms because banks are 
inherently more opaque (Huang, 2006). Indeed, banks own few physical and visible 
assets, and investors can assess a bank’s performance and asset quality based only 
on accounting numbers. However, it is well known that aggregate accounting 
numbers without reasonable level of breakdown is less informative for banks than 
it is in industrial firms, because the most important information usually lies in the 
details of the sources of income and expenses, or quality of assets. Investors need 
this information to make forward-looking judgements on wich incomes are 
sustainable and which expenses are recurring (Huang, 2006). Yet, due to the 
complexity of financial environments and the increasing diversity in the 
information needs, banks should comply also with the supervisory regulation from 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, which seeks to foster a secure and 
reliable financial sector (Oliveira et. al., 2011).  
In this regard, what should be noted is that many initiatives have been made by 
regulators such as the IASB and the Basel Committee to standardize financial 
reporting of banks, to make information more comparable across the sector. In 
particular, it has been argued that “one area in which supervisors are well suited to 
take on a productive role is in enhancing comparability by promoting the use of 
supervisory definitions and reporting classifications in public disclosure”. (Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision, 1998). The main aim of (different sources of) 
regulation is to make banking risk disclosure of use to investors.  
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To enhance banks risk disclosure, regulators and standard setters have attempted 
to develop a complex set of standards, thus requiring more information on different 
types of risks (Frolov, 2007; Dobler et al., 2011). However, despite the continuous 
raising of the minimum requirements, financial companies do not generally provide 
adequate information on risk (ICAEW, 2011), and practitioners (ICAEW, 2011, 
2002; E&Y, 2008; KPMG, 2009, 2008; PWC, 2008) still warn about the lack of 
information on banks’ risk taking. Moreover, despite the increasing in the quantity of 
the information provided as a result of the new requirements to be complied with, the 
vast amount of research on this topic agreeing that risk disclosure is not useful for 
stakeholders as it is not really detailed, not forward-looking, not sufficient for the 
assessment of the overall risk profile (Magnan and Markarian, 2011; Paape and 
Speklè, 2012), and not relevant for the decision making process (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004), as well as the general consensus on the inadequacy of current risk 
disclosure, literature is far from being conclusive. Therefore, there is need to further 
investigate the reason for the (un)usefulness of risk disclosure by banks.  
Several authors attempt to find out some possible causes explaining the 
inadequacy of risk information. Some of them recognised the importance of 
mandatory rules for an effective and useful risk disclosure, others made call for a 
strong enforcement system for the adoption and the application of the requirements 
issued by different regulators. On the other hand, recent studies ascribe the 
(un)usefulness of risk reportig to the regulatory system itself, and highlight some 
limitations of current regulations per se rather than the question of compliance.   
More in depth, they shed light on the degree of discretion contained in the exsisting 
multiple requirements, which allows insiders to disclose what they want to 
disclose. It has been argued that managers have been seen to omit information 
allowing third parties to modify their understanding both of risks and the accuracy of 
the suggested profitability (Leuz, 2010; Thuèlin et al., 2006). 
On the basis of the above consideration, drawing on the role that insiders may 
paly in influencing risk disclosure, it could be of interest to shift the focus from the 
external perspective (mainly related to the reporting risk), to the internal perspective 
pertaining the management of risk within banking organizations.  
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Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in banking risk management 
(Arena et al. 2010, Gephart et al., 2009; Power, 2007; Scapens & Bromwich, 2009), 
which has moved from peripheral functional areas of the organization to the 
corporate level. Publications, corporate websites and official reports often contain 
specific sections devoted to how (financial) organizations manage their risks. Also, 
risk management standards issued by professional organisations have also stimulated 
interest in the development of risk management systems (for example Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2012, 2004, Association of 
Insurance and Risk Managers, 2002). 
However, the latest financial crisis has shown relevant failures of traditional large 
banks (Linsley and Slack, 2012), revealing substantial weaknesses in their risk 
reporting and risk management practices (Paape and Speklè, 2012; Magnan and 
Markarian, 2011; Power, 2009).  Literature emphasized that financial reporting do 
not properly account for uncertainity, did not adequately monitor, measure and 
disclose the impact of risk taking by banks on financial statements, and did not warn 
of impending meltdown. On the other hand, shortcoming in accounting interacted 
with failures in governance and risk management practices (Magnan M. and 
Markarian G., 2011). In many cases, risk management systems failed not because of 
computer model per se but because of failure in governance, as information about 
exposure and strategies did not reach senior management (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Moreover, a majority of banks have indicated that their boards were not properly 
knowledgeable about their risk management (Lapido et al., 2008). In contrast to 
expectation and estabilished best practices, this suggest that risk management is not 
at the heart of the planning and governance, a blatant functional failure. 
In response to the above described failures relating the both the accounting and 
governance systems, interest in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has grown 
rapidly, with regulators, professional associations and even rating firms calling for its 
adoption (Arena et al., 2010). Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has been proposed 
as a new instrument to predict risks and help organisations achieve their goals. It is 
centred on the idea of risk management as a transversal process that addresses all those 
events, which could prevent the achievement of corporate objectives.   
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Many banks have adopted the mission and principles of ERM. However, in 
literature there is a lack of evidence of studies examining how enterprise risk 
management works in action (Mikes, 2009), and there are few critical contributions 
addressing how its organizational assembling evolves, and contributes to an effective 
risk management style (Gephart et. al., 2009; Power, 2009).  
What should be emphasized is that, during the last few years an increasing 
number of voices have urged calls have been made for the introduction of ethical 
consideration into firms’ activities as well as in their decisions making processes 
(Barbu and Vintilà, 2007; de Graaf, 2006). To this purpose, two conditions must be 
met: individuals who have an ethical concern must take part in the market and have 
sufficient resources to transmit a clear and strong message to firms (Brickley et al., 
2002). In this regard, it has been argued that the banking system could fulfil these 
two conditions and can generate ethical engagements, not only for itself and for its 
customers, but also for society through achievement of social purposes (de La 
Cuesta-Gonzàlez et al., 2006). Consequently, calls have been made for for fully 
integrating social and ethical values into banking enterprise risk management 
practices, in order to strengthen the holistic system for managing uncertainty as well as 
increasing the stakeholder value protection. The (inter)relation between business 
ethics and Enterprise Risk Management Practices has been answered by a slowly 
growing collection of academic (Demidenko and Mc Nutt, 2010; Weitzner and 
Darroch, 2010) and practitioners (as for example, The Institute of Internal Auditors, 
The Global Association of Risk Professionals, the Institute of Risk Management), 
who have begun to address issues in this field. 
Given the above-cited still debated issues concerning the reporting and the 
management of risk in the banking sector, it is worth emphasizing at this stage the 
importance of deepening current knowledge on these concerns, by also shedding 
light on the need to go further the mere compliance with current regulation, thus 
moving to an ethical approach, in order to disclose and managing risk effectively.  
Above all, the topic is relevant to the Italian context, which is expected to enhance 
the usefulness of risk disclosure as well as the effectiveness of risk management 
systems.  
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The Italian setting is extremely relevant because there is a government regulator 
(Bank of Italy) overseeing compliance with risk disclosure. Moreover, Italy adopts 
“interventionist enforcements” (Bischof, 2009), which are regarded as a critical tool 
for achieving the minimum disclosure requirements (Frolov, 2006; Oliveira et al., 
2011). Hence, it is interesting to discuss if the Italian regulation, which is 
characterize by a strong enforcement system, is able to enhance the usefulness of risk 
disclosure by banks.  
A second aspect to take into account is that the above-cited literature on 
mandatory risk disclosure in the banking sector has largely neglected the effects of 
increasingly detailed regulation that requires information on risks in two different 
reports, i.e., notes to financial statement and public report required by the third pillar 
of the New Capital Accord (henceforth, public report). Therefore, it could be of 
interest to further investigate how Italian banks provide risk information and, 
therefore, if it is of use to investors, by focusing on the characteristics of such 
information to find out any differences between the notes to the financial statements 
and the public report, both prepared according the instructions of the Bank of Italy. 
Also, as a result of the increasing attention paid to the need for ethical values in 
“doing business”, there is need to move from the external perspective to the internal 
perception of risk, analysing how to deal with risk issues within banking companies.  
Hence, the thesis is divided in three chapters, as follows: 
 CHAPTER ONE: Enhancing the usefulness of qualitative risk disclosure by banks: 
the role of current regulation in Italy; 
 CHAPTER TWO: (Un)useful risk disclosure: explanation from the Italian banks; 
 CHAPTER THREE: Enterprise Risk Management in local banks: a case study. 
At this stage, it is worth emphasizing that although each of the papers/chapters 
investigates a specific issue and adopts its own theoretical and methodological 
approach, the design of the overall research is conceived as a whole. The choices 
relating to specific topics, theoretical models of reference and methodological 
approaches have been made also with regard to the findings and emerging issues that 
arose gradually while the study was in progress. 
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The first chapter aims to address whether the increasing in risk disclosure standard 
and authoritative disclosure recommendations are able to enhance the usefulness of 
banking risk disclosure by Italian banks. Indeed, as discussed above, recent literature 
emphasized that regulators and standard-setters face a taxing challenge in deciding 
how risk disclosure could be regulated most effectively, in order to make company risk 
reporting more useful to investors (Miihkinen 2013, Miihkinen 2012, Oliveira et al. 
2011, Leuz 2010). 
What should be noted is that, as clarified above, Italy system enforces the 
regulation more strictly, (Bischof, 2009), and introduces a national government 
regulator (Bank of Italy) overseeing compliance with risk disclosures. Such a 
system entails additional provisions for financial institution issued from Bank of 
Italy (Circular no. 262/2005 and Circular no. 263/2006), which should imply an 
high level of quality/quantity of the information on risks. In this regard, it is also 
interesting to underline that Italian banks have to comply with different sources of 
law, i.e. accounting rules and supervisory principles. To meet different information 
needs, and to protect several interests involved, regulators require Italian banks to 
provide information in three different reports (Notes to the Financial Statement, 
Management Commentary, Public Report). 
 As a result of the increasing in regulatory requirements to be complied with, 
and due to the additional provisions that better specify what is stated at the 
European level, the degree of detail of qualitative risk information required should 
be higher than under the previous regulation. It should also be higher than risk 
disclosure by banks operating in States that do not imply “interventionist 
enforcement” system. Consequently, qualitative risk disclosure by Italian banks is 
expected to be of use, in concrete terms, to investors.  
Thus, this paper provides a systematic analysis of the qualitative information 
required by different regulators, and discusses the ability of such the regulatory 
framework to enhance the usefulness, in terms of comparability, verifiability, timeliness 
and understandability, of risk disclosure (IASB, Framework 2010, par. QC19). 
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The second chapter, in acknowledging several limitations in the first research, 
the reasons why risk disclosure looks less useful than it ought to be, by analyzing 
the risk disclosure provided by Italian banks. Indeed, although regulation requires 
complex disclosures, it is recognised that they are not relevant to assessing the risk 
profile of banks, as initially intended. 
Accordingly, it investigates how risk information is provided by Italian banks, 
focusing on the characteristics of the information to assess the overall quality of 
disclosure, to find any differences between the Notes to Financial Statements and the 
Public Report, both prepared in compliance with the instructions of the Bank of Italy. 
A content analysis of the risk infromation made available by 66 Italian banks has 
been carried out to investigate the variation in the level of risk disclosure between the 
Notes to Financial Statements and Public Reports. In the end, we use a regression 
model for disclosure quality to find out what the bank-specific factors that influence 
the quality of disclosure are. 
Differently from the first and second chapters, the third one pays attention to the 
management of risk, with the aim to examine from the internal perspective the 
problems concerning “how to deal with risk issues”. More in depth, shifting the focus 
from the question of compliance with current regulation (intended as both rules and 
recommendation) to the concerns relating to the effectiveness of the implementation 
of enterprise risk management system (ERM) within a particular kind of banking firms.  
In particular, as a result of the calls for the introduction of ethical consideration 
into firms’ activities as well as in their decisions making processes (Barbu and 
Vintilà, 2007; de La Cuesta-Gonzàlez et al., 2006), this paper aims to explore how 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) can lead banks to achieve their economic and 
social purposes. Such banks are a particularly suitable basis for studying the 
relationship between business ethics and ERM due to the fact that they aim to 
achieve strong social purposes.  
A single case study on the most representative mutual credit cooperative bank of 
the South of Italy is employed. The results are discussed drawing on the theoretical 
framework developed by Bowie (1999) in order to apply Kantian ethics to the 
organizational design of a business firms.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Purpose: This paper analyses banking risk disclosure regulation in Italy. It addresses whether the 
increasing in risk disclosure standard and authoritative disclosure recommendations are able to 
enhance the usefulness of banking risk disclosure. For the purposes of the analysis, we rely on what is 
clearly stated by the IASB: “The usefulness of financial information is enhanced if it is comparable, 
verifiable, timely and understandable” (Framework 2010, para QC19). 
Design: The study relies on the Italian country setting, identified as an example of best practice for 
risk disclosure. In particular, this research examines the different risk disclosure requirements, issued 
by different regulators, to be provided in three different documents (Notes to the Financial Statement, 
Management Commentary, Public Report). More in depth, we focus on qualitative information, which 
should provide more detailed insights relating to the choices of the management of risks. 
Findings: The results shed light on some limitations of the complex system of risk disclosure 
regulation, highlighting the overlaps and/or lacks of the multiple requirements. They also provide a 
basis for some critical thoughts about the ability of current regulation to enhance the usefulness of risk 
disclosure, emphasizing that the weaknesses of banking risk disclosure do not represent a question of 
compliance but reflect the inefficiencies of regulation per se.  
Value: This research aims at being relevant from a theoretical perspective, by contributing to risk 
disclosure literature through a critical analysis of the current risk disclosure regulation. It also 
provides a contribution for national and international standard setters, policy makers, and supervisory 
authorities, by highlighting some limitations of the complex system of risk disclosure regulation. 
 
Keywords: IFRS 7, accounting regulation, banking sector  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of financial reporting is to provide information that is useful to existing 
and potential users (FASB, 1978; IASB, 1989, 2010). To this end, information must 
be relevant and faithfully represents what it purports to represent (IASB, 2010).  
However, the lack of usefulness of accounting information currently issued by 
firms has been frequently remarked by scholars (Paape and Speklè, 2012; Magnan 
and Markarian, 2011; Bushman and Landsman, 2010; Leuz, 2010; Frolov, 2007; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Verrecchia, 2001), 
practitioners (EFRAG 2012; ICAEW, 2011; ICAEW 2002; E&Y, 2008; KPMG, 
2009, 2008; PWC, 2008), and standard setters (IASB 2012), especially for 
information concerning risks. In this regard, it has been argued that the inadequacy 
of current risk information is one of the main weaknesses in the accounting 
information disclosed by firms (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004).  
To enhance the usefulness of the external risk information, over the last years 
several rules relating to risk disclosure have been issued from different regulators, 
thus defining a continuous raising of the minimum requirements, both quantitative 
and qualitative, to be complied with (Regulation n. 108/2006; Directive 2003/51/EC, 
and Directive 2004/109/EC). Recent studies have investigated, from both theoretical 
and practical perspective, the issues related to accounting regulation and the 
usefulness of risk disclosure. Frolov (2007) summarized the reason why we have 
mandatory risk disclosure rules in banking, and level of “desirability” of disclosure 
requirements. On the other hand, some authors have recently addressed certain 
limitations of current accounting regulation in enhancing the usefulness of risk 
disclosure by firms, emphasising the discretion built into risk disclosure 
requirements. In this regard, it has been argued that the discretion allowed by current 
regulatory system does not merely rely on the content of the accounting standards, 
but is likely to be a function of each country’s institutional setting (Leuz, 2010; 
Bischof, 2009, Ball et al., 2003). However, despite the general consensus on the 
inadequacy of current risk disclosure regulation, there has been little attempt by 
academic community to discuss if the new requirements can make influence on the 
usefulness of risk disclosure.  
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Given this background, this research focuses on banking risk disclosure regulation 
in Italy, with specific regard to qualitative aspects, as they should enable a better 
understanding of firms’ decisions in providing more detailed insights relating to the 
management of risks (Abraham et al., 2012; Berger, 2011; Beyer et al., 2010). 
More in depth, the study addresses whether the increasing in risk disclosure standard 
and authoritative disclosure recommendations are able to enhance the usefulness of 
banking risk disclosure. For the purposes of the analysis, we rely on what is clearly 
stated by the IASB: “the usefulness of financial information is enhanced if it is 
comparable, verifiable, timely and understandable” (Framework 2010, par. QC19). 
More in depth, this paper focuses on qualitative information required by different 
regulators, to be provided in different reports (Notes to the Financial Statement, 
Management Commentary, Public Report).  
What should be clarified from the outset of this research is that we do not want to 
criticize one or more requirements specifically, nor to suggest some specific change 
of thereof. Rather, the purpose is to stimulate some reflections about the current 
regulatory model, and to understand whether or not the raising of minimum 
requirements leads to a more useful risk disclosure.  
The analysis refers to the banking sector, which is a particular interesting field. 
On one hand, banking activity mainly relies on management, measurement, control 
and communication of risks, which are the key-drivers of banking value creation 
(Maffei, 2010). On the other hand, banks should comply with additional and specific 
regulatory requirements related to different sources of law (i.e. Basel II, as endorsed 
by Directive 2006/48/CE and Directive 2006/49/CE, and, starting from 2015, Basel 
III, draft Directive COM/2011/452 e COM/2011/453), due to the fundamental role 
played in the economic system. In such a field, risk disclosure moves from a mere 
technical practice to a broader and relevant matter from the economical, political, 
and social perspective, becoming crucial for different users (Allegrini, 2011).  
The research is carried out within the Italian setting. The Italian setting is 
extremely relevant because there is a government regulator (Bank of Italy) 
overseeing compliance with risk disclosure.  
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Moreover, Italy has been identified as an example of best practice for risk 
disclosure (Bischof, 2009), mainly for the active and interventionist role played by 
the Supervisory Authority (Banca d’Italia), who issued additional administrative 
provision for banks to apply the IFRS and the Basel II Accord. 
However, despite the multiple sources of law, and the high level of enforcement, 
both aiming at enhancing the usefulness of qualitative risk disclosure by the Italian 
banks, the analysis shows some lacks and/or overlaps in Italian risk disclosure 
regulation. It implies that, although Italian banks formally comply with both the 
international and national law, there is room for them to choose what they want to 
show, with undeniable effects on the effective usefulness of the information 
provided. 
The contribution of the research is twofold. On the one hand, the paper adds to 
prior literature through a critical analysis of the different sources of the current risk 
disclosure regulation in a specific context. In addition, the research could be of 
interest for practitioners and regulators, by highlighting some limitations of current 
regulation and emphasizing for the need for framing a more systemic complex of risk 
disclosure requirement, in order to ensure the usefulness of risk disclosure. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
role, the structure, and the purpose of the existing risk disclosure regulation. 
Subsequently, the research provides a systematic overview of the Italian risk 
disclosure regulation, emphasizing the requirements issued by different regulators. 
The discussion section, drawing on the Italian case, highlights the (un)usefulness of 
risk disclosure, while the last section concludes the study.  
2. Theoretical background  
Regulation represents the conceptual underpinning for any relationship between 
firms and the modern State (Leuz, 2010; Moran 2010). As a necessary response to the 
complexities of economic government in capitalist democracy, it increased in 
importance and became a necessary alternative to majoritarian models of democratic 
decision-making (Moran, 2010), which imply a less active and interventionist role of 
the State (Majone, 1999). 
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From a theoretical perspective, the ideology of regulation relies on the constant 
effort of the State in pursuing the public interest, trying to meet the political reasons 
with the economic constraints. In this regard, regulation recognizes a role for 
“lobbies”, regarded as groups of key parties in the economy, playing an active and 
powerful role in the political process, by making pressures towards specific 
regulatory choices. In this view, special interest lobbying is not perceived as a sort of 
bribery, but rather as a mechanism through which regulators are informed about 
political issues (Sutton, 1984).   
From a practical perspective, the framework briefly described above fits, in 
essence, with what accounting regulation is. Accounting regulation is to be intended 
as the output of a complex regulatory process, resulting from multiple interactions 
between different political ideologies and different interests to be considered.  
In particular, the European Union, choosing to adopt the IFRS, agreed with a 
specific regulatory model established on a principle-based system of accounting 
standards, in which the Standard Setting Body is not responsible for the definition of 
a set of mandatory rules. Indeed, due to their “principle-based nature”, accounting 
standards are not legally binding per se, but must go through the due process of 
endorsement before becoming law in the EU (Di Pietra and Riccaboni, 2002). In 
addition, they have to be enforced by different national regulatory systems. 
Consequently, despite the adoption of a common set of accounting standards should 
led to a more useful information, risk disclosure requirements differ considerably 
across Europe, and even if enforcement systems appear to be similar in design, there can 
be substantial differences in enforcement intensity (or practices).  
With specific reference to risk disclosure, the main accounting standard is IFRS 7 
“Financial Instruments – Disclosures” (henceforth, IFRS 7). IFRS 7 superseded IAS 
30 and replaced all parts of IAS 32, thus embracing all disclosure requirements 
related to the use of financial instruments. The above-mentioned standard aims at 
meeting growing concerns about risks arising from financial instruments, that were 
brought up particularly by the Joint Working Group (JWG) of Standard Setters in its 
Draft Standard (Joint Working Group of Standard Setters, 1999) and by the Bank for 
International Settlements in the Third Pillar of the Basel II Framework (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). 
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As IFRS 7 can be regarded as a result of a common effort for regulating risk 
disclosure most effectively, the new requirements are expected to increase the 
usefulness of risk disclosure, which should be able to provide a “real” picture of the 
overall banking risk profile.   
However, accounting literature addressed considerable doubts that these benefits 
occurred as a result of worldwide IFRS application (Allegrini 2011; Hail et al., 2010; 
Bischof, 2009;). Specifically, it has been highlighted that, despite IFRS 7 adoption 
has had a positive effect on the quantity of risk information, it had not equally 
increased the quality of risk disclosure provided by European banks (Bischof, 2009). 
In other words, the raising of minimum risk disclosure requirements has not been 
followed by growth in the usefulness of risk information, which is enhanced if it is 
comparable, verifiable, timely and understandable (IASB, Framework 2010, QC4). 
Despite several efforts have been made to converge countries’ risk reporting 
standards, some relevant issues, related to the information to be reported and the 
“right” level of risk disclosure, still remain unanswered.  The first point in turn leads 
us to the issue of what the goals of reporting regulation are.  
If the main goal (Zingales, 2009) of risk reporting is to produce cost savings for 
investors as a whole (both small investors and financial intermediaries), risk 
disclosure should report all those information desired by users, and that firms are 
willing to provide voluntarily, stipulating private contracts (Ross, 1979). Otherwise, 
if risk reporting aims to reduce costs from fraud and agency conflicts, risk disclosure 
should report all those information needed for controlling the insiders, in order to 
identify (and reduce) their possible misconduct (Leuz, 2010). 
Another central argument related to risk disclosure regulation pertains the level of 
detail and pervasiveness of the existing requirements or, in other words, the degree of 
discretion allowed by current regulatory system. In this regard, recent literature 
pointed out that discretion is a double-edged sword, and highlighted the pros and 
cons of regulating risk reporting through principle-based standards (Leuz, 2010; 
Moran, 2010). Principles-based standards give more discretion to firms, by enabling 
managers to convey private information that resides within the firm and to adapt 
reports so that they better reflect the underlying riskiness of the economic reality. 
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Such an approach can save costs to firms, if it requires those disclosures that almost 
all firms are willing to give voluntarily (Mahoney, 1995). However, the discretion 
also allows insiders to make use of risk reporting in order to show what they want to 
show, and to hide potentially relevant proprietary information (to their competitors or 
to the public as a whole).  
Regarding the discretion built into banking risk reporting regulation, it has been 
emphasized that it does not merely rely on the content of the accounting standards, 
but is likely to be a function of each country’s institutional setting (Leuz, 2010; 
Bischof, 2009, Ball et al., 2003). More in depth, with specific reference to the IFRS 7 
adoption, cross-country differences still persist, relating to those interpretations of 
the above mentioned principle that not only clarify but also restrict several disclosure 
choices.  
As far as the “specific” banking regulation is regarded, what should be noted is 
that EU lacks a common Supervisory Authority, which could ensure the fully 
harmonization of banking supervision across Europe. The Guidelines issued by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) for promoting convergence of supervisory 
practices are to be intended as mere “recommendation”, without any force of law 
(Bischof, 2009). Hence, a crucial role in defining mandatory banking supervisory 
provisions is played by the Supervisory Authorities of each State.  
Therefore, the poor usefulness of risk disclosure, in terms of lack comparability, 
verifiability, timeliness and understandability, is likely to be partially explained by 
different home country regulations and, more in depth, by the heterogeneity in the 
application of both IFRS 7 and supervisory provisions. 
3. The Italian country setting  
This section describes the risk disclosure regulatory system in Italy, by clarifying 
the peculiarities relating to the existence of several sources of law, which are 
mandatory in different way, and identifying the specific requirements issued by 
different regulators. The aim is to addresses whether the increasing in detailed risk 
disclosure standard and authoritative disclosure recommendations are able to 
enhance the usefulness of banking risk disclosure. 
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The analysis focuses on qualitative requirements, which integrate quantitative 
data, with the purpose to give a complete information of the banking overall risk 
profile through additional and complementary elements, thereby facilitating users in 
the different investment choices.  
What should be noted is that Italian banks are required to provide (qualitative) 
risk information in three different reports: notes to the financial statement, 
management commentary, and public report.   
Regarding risk disclosure in the notes to the financial statements, IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments: disclosures (as endorsed by Regulation EC n. 1126/2008 and 
subsequently slightly amended by further regulations), which is regarded as the 
primary sources of law, requires information on the nature and extent of the risks that 
arise from financial instruments. The standard recommends quantitative and 
narrative information on credit risk, collateral and other credit enhancements, 
liquidity risk, market risk and sensitivity analysis, and other market risk. However, 
in order to avoid affecting information, no specific format for disclosure is required 
or even suggested. 
Although IFRS are legally binding in Italy, and IFRS 7 represents the main 
standard for risk disclosure, the decree-law n. 38 of 28 February 2005 conferred on 
the national supervisory authority the jurisdiction to issue the administrative 
provisions to apply the IFRS in the banking sector. Consequently, Bank of Italy has 
issued the Circular 262/2005 Bank’s financial statement: layouts and preparation 
(henceforth, Circular), which is periodically amended to account for changes in 
European Union accounting regulations.  
Circular introduces further instructions representing a secondary source of law for 
risk disclosure. In particular, with the aim to ensure the comparability of financial 
statement for external users, unlike IFRS 7, Circular insists on a mandatory and 
specific format for the notes, and specifies that a section of the notes should be 
organized in such a way as to provide quantitative and qualitative information on 
credit risk, securitisation, interest rate risk and price risk, exchange risk, liquidity risk 
and operational risk.  
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Hence, within risk disclosure requirements for the notes to the financial statement, 
analogies and differences exist between accounting regulation (IFRS 7) and national 
instructions (Circular 262/2005).  
The table below shows some similarities between the above-mentioned sources of law. 
Table 1 – Similar requirements between IFRS 7 and Bank of Italy instructions 
IFRS 7 CIRCOLARE 262/2005 
Objectives, policies and processes 
 to manage credit risk,  
as well as methods used to measure the risk 
and 
Any changes [in the previous requirements]  
 from the preceding year 
and 
Risk exposure and how credit risk occurs 
General information on the credit risk 
and 
Management, measurement and control 
systems of the credit risk 
The methods and assumptions used  
in developing the sensitivity analysis 
and 
Changes since last year 
in the methods and assumptions used, 
as well as the reasons for such changes 
and 
An explanation of the method used  
to prepare this sensitivity analysis,  
as well as the main parameters and assumptions 
underlying the data supplied 
and 
An explanation of the purpose of the method used,  
as well as the constraints  
that could make information not fully reflect  
the fair value of assets and liabilities involved 
General aspects, management processes and 
measurement methods  
of interest rate risk and price risk  
 
Risk exposure and how market risk occurs 
and 
Objectives, policies and processes  
to manage market risk,  
as well as methods used to measure the risk 
and 
Any changes [in the previous two requirements]  
from the preceding year. 
General aspects on the market risk 
 
Risk exposure and how liquidity risk occurs 
and  
Objectives, policies and processes  
to manage liquidity risk,  
as well as methods used to measure the risk 
and 
A description of how it manages the liquidity risk 
and 
Any changes [in the previous two requirements]  
from the preceding year 
General aspects, management processes and 
measurement methods  
of the liquidity risk 
 A description of securities and  
other improvements taken credit  
and 
Where the assets are not readily convertible into cash,  
its policies to alienate or dispose of  
by other means such assets, or for use in its activities. 
 
Technique to mitigate credit risk 
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Table 1 identifies qualitative risk disclosure requirements issued by both, the 
international accounting standard and domestic law, and shows that the two regulators 
require for the same risks, thus highlighting some overlaps in current regulation. 
On the basis of the above consideration, some reflections are due. Bearing in mind 
the idea at the basis of Italian regulatory system, the role of the National Authority 
should consist of providing further and more specific prescriptions to apply IFRS. 
However, as is clarified by table 1, the additional provisions issued by Bank of Italy 
seems to be more general and less detailed than IFRS 7, which better specifies the 
qualitative information about risk to be reported (see, for example, what is stated for 
technique to mitigate credit risk).  
In addition, there are also requirements issued only by one of the two regulators. 
In fact, Italian banks are required to comply with IFRS, also with reference to certain 
items that are not explicitly addressed by Bank of Italy
1
. Likewise, Italian 
Supervisory Authority sometimes requires particular information even if not covered 
by the IASB. Table 2 sets out in detail the cases of mismatch. 
 Table 2– Different requirements issued by IASB and Bank of Italy 
A significant difference between the two mentioned sources of law pertains 
operational risk. What should be noted is that, unlike the Bank of Italy, IFRS 7 does 
not require for operational risk in the notes to the financial statement, due to the lack 
of close relation to financial instruments, as well as to the absence of an accounting 
                                                          
1 Basis for Conclusion on IFRS 7, section BC65 2005 «(…) the Board noted that the definition and measurement of operational 
risk are in their infancy and are not necessarily related to financial instruments. It also decided that such disclosures would be 
more appropriately located outside the financial statements. Therefore, the Board decided to defer this issue to its research 
project on management commentary». 
IFRS 7  CIRCOLARE 262/2005 
Information about the credit quality 
of financial assets that are not in arrears  
or have deteriorated its value. 
General aspects, management processes and 
measurement methods 
of the operational risk. 
An analysis of the maturities of financial liabilities  
that shows the time remaining contractual maturity. 
Qualitative information on securitizing 
When the sensitivity analysis were not 
representative of the risk inherent in a financial 
instrument, the entity inform this, and why it 
creed that sensitivity analyses lack representativeness. 
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measure for it. Therefore, the IASB defers the presentation of operational risk 
information in management commentary
2
.  
However, beyond the considerations relating to specific regulatory requirements, 
what should be noted is that national law, which is expected to ensure a larger degree 
of enforcement, fails in its aim.  
In theory, Italian Supervisory Authority should better specify what is stated by the 
IASB, especially for those issues not covered by IFRS 7. In practice, Bank of Italy 
does not clarify the European accounting regulation, as is silent about some items 
laid down by the International Accounting Standard Board. Indeed, there are no 
additional provisions relating to the credit quality of financial assets, to the analysis 
of the maturities of financial liabilities, as well as to the sensitivity analysis that are 
not representative of the risk inherent in a financial instrument. Bank of Italy has not 
issued further and more detailed directions for preparing financial statements in 
accordance with international accounting standards.  
Therefore, the above consideration allows us to affirm that Italian regulation is not 
helpful for the enforcement and interpretation of IFRS 7, as it does not clarify 
disclosure choices in essence.  
Hence, risk disclosure provided by Italian banks in the notes to the financial 
statement is heavily affected by the characteristics of the regulatory system. On the 
one hand, international guidelines do not suggest a specific format, in order to ensure 
that risk disclosure derives directly from the corporate information flows, thus 
avoiding to constrain risk disclosure to the "rigidity" of certain patterns previously 
identified. On the other hand, national provisions fail in the attempt to better specify 
what is stated by the international standard for risk disclosure since, as clarified from 
Table n. 1 and 2, Circular 262/2005, in some cases, requires information more general 
than IFRS 7, while in others, does not compel some of the IFRS 7 requirements.  
                                                          
2 International Accounting Standards Board (2005), Basis for Conclusion on IFRS 7, Section BC65: “(…) the 
Board noted that the definition and measurement of operational risk are in their infancy and are not necessarily 
related to financial instruments. It also decided that such disclosures would be more appropriately located outside 
the financial statements. Therefore, the Board decided to defer this issue to its research project on management 
commentary”. 
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Consequently, the set of risk disclosure rules is sometimes redundant, sometimes 
is lacking, and is not ensuring, in essence, an effective system of strong enforcement, 
only in theory ensured by Italian risk disclosure regulation. 
Regarding risk disclosure in management commentary, the primary source of law 
does not specify mandatory provisions regarding the risk disclosure format. Indeed, 
the IASB has not issued a specific standard, just introducing an IFRS practice 
statement (Caldarelli, 2010), which is not mandatory in the EU. European accounting 
regulation merely defines the contents of risk disclosure, which should cover only the 
major categories of risk (strategic, commercial, operational and financial) and the 
related procedures of risk taking and risk mitigation. Therefore, Italian banks have to 
comply only with the secondary source of law.  In this regard, National Authority 
also establishes that Italian banks should show “further information” not provided in 
the notes to the financial statement, about the aims and policies related to their risk 
taking as well as the management and hedging of financial risks (price risk, credit 
risk, liquidity risk, and risk of fluctuation in cash flows). Clearly, there is also room 
here for discretion in delivering qualitative information on risk.  
In addition, banks are required to provide risk disclosure in a further document, 
that is the “Public Report” required by the third pillar of the Committee’s International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework 
(henceforth, Accord), formalized in Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 
2006/49/EC, recently amended by Directive 2010/76/EC. The third pillar of the 
Basel Committee’s International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: a Revised Framework (henceforth, Accord), as agreed by the European 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC of 14 June 2006, contains a large number of 
options for risk disclosure, and discretion that may be applied depending on the 
specific national circumstances. 
Since decree-law n. 297 of 27 December 2006 conferred on the Bank of Italy the 
jurisdiction to issue the administrative provisions, these directives have been 
transposed in Italy through Circular 263/2006 “New regulations for the prudential 
supervision of banks” (henceforth, Circular 236/2006), that is the secondary source 
of law relating to the prudential supervision (capital structure and capital adequacy). 
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The preparation of this document meets the disclosure requirements relating to 
capital adequacy and risk exposure, and also pursues objectives of accountability and 
transparency of management, to be of use for different market participants. 
The following table shows the similarities and differences between requirements 
enclosed in the New Capital Accord and the provisions defined in Circular 263/2006
3
. 
Table 3 – A comparison between New Capital Accord and Bank of Italy instructions 
NEW CAPITAL ACCORD BANK OF ITALY INSTRUCTIONS 
Credit risk 
 general disclosures for all banks 
Credit risk  
general disclosures for all banks 
Credit risk:  
disclosures for portfolios  
subject to the standardised approach  
and supervisory risk weights in the IRB approaches 
Credit risk:  
disclosures for portfolios t 
reated under the standardized  approach  
and specialized lending and equity exposures  
treated under IRB approaches 
Credit risk 
 disclosures for portfolios subject to IRB approaches 
Credit risk 
disclosures for portfolios under IRB approaches 
Credit risk mitigation  
disclosures for standardised and IRB approaches 
Risk mitigation techniques 
Counterparty risk 
General disclosure for exposures  
related to counterparty credit risk 
Counterparty risk 
Securitisation  
disclosure for standardised and IRB approaches 
Securitization transactions 
Market risk 
disclosures for banks using the standardised approach 
- 
Market risk 
disclosures for banks using  
the internal models approach (IMA)  
for trading portfolios 
Market risks  
disclosures for banks using the internal 
models approach (IMA) for position risk, 
foreign exchange risk and commodity risk 
Operational risk Operational risk 
Equities  
disclosures for banking book positions 
Equity exposures 
disclosures for banking book positions 
Interest rate risk in the banking book Interest rate risk position in the banking book 
 
From Table n. 3 it is easy to find out some areas of overlaps/redundancy related to all 
cases in which the risk-items are formally covered by both the Basel Committee and 
                                                          
3 Circular 263/2006 follows the Directive’s requirements, which, therefore, have not been reported in the table.  
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national Authority. Indeed, the two sources of law identify the same risk categories 
to be disclosed in the public report. In other words, banks show in two different 
reports the risk items. 
However, for each risk category, there are some differences pertaining the 
information to be substantially disclosed. Some explanations are described below. 
With regard to credit risk, the Accord also suggests a discussion of the management 
policy and requires banks that have partly (but not fully) adopted either the foundation 
IRB approach or the advanced IRB approach to show additional information.              
In relation to market risk, the agreement Accord requires information for banks using 
the standardized approach, while the Circular does not compel it at all.                 
With regard to the communication of market risk related to trading portfolios, 
assuming use of internal models approach (IMA), the Accord calls for an illustration 
of the requirements supporting the determination of the capital adequacy by the bank. 
However, with regard to the aspects pertaining “equity exposures”, the Circular 
introduces additional specifications related to the characteristics of the remuneration 
and incentives systems applied for the parties involved in the control of risks, with a 
particular focus on the criteria used for the evaluation of the results achieved and the 
adjustment and correction policies implemented.  
Risk disclosure in the Public Report is affected by the lack of a systematic regulation. 
Beyond the similar attention paid from different regulators to the same risk issues, 
what emerges from the analysis is a lack of national regulation on certain elements 
required by the Accord (such as, for example, policies for managing credit risk) and 
a choice of the Circular to consider some unique aspects not covered by the Basel 
Committee, but without bothering to define any areas of discretion. 
 It should be noted that, beyond mandatory risk disclosure required by different 
regulators, Italian banks may provide additional information, voluntary in nature, in 
order to provide a picture as detailed as possible about their overall risk exposure.  
4. Discussions 
The active role of the State in defining processes which are critical to the 
regulation of economic life was considered of great importance, (Moran, 2010; 2002) 
especially with reference to the theory and practice of accounting. As a result of the 
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recent financial crisis, many European countries (such as Belgium, Germany and 
Ireland) have changed their regulatory framework, by introducing, for supervisory 
purposes, an ad hoc national Authority of the banking firms (Masciandaro et al., 2012). 
The effort aimed at introducing a stronger enforcement system in order to better 
specify the rules/principle issued at European level, in order to improve the 
usefulness of risk disclosure to investors. 
On this basis, the study addresses whether the increasing in risk disclosure 
standard and authoritative disclosure recommendations are able to enhance the 
usefulness of banking risk disclosure.  
Italy adopts the “interventionist enforcement” system, and introduces a national 
government regulator (Bank of Italy) overseeing compliance with risk disclosures.  
Such a system entails additional provisions for financial institution issued from Bank 
of Italy (Circular no. 262/2005 and Circular no. 263/2006), which should imply an 
high level of quality/quantity of the information on risks. In this regard, it is 
interesting to underline that, due to the fundamental role played in the economic 
system, Italian banks have to comply with both, accounting rules and supervisory 
principles different sources of law. Also, to meet different information needs, and to 
protect several interests involved, regulators require two different sets of disclosures, 
which have to be provided by Italian banks. As a result of the increasing in 
regulatory requirements to be complied with, and due to the additional provisions 
that better specify what is stated at the European level, the degree of detail of 
qualitative risk information required should be higher than under the previous 
regulation. It should also be higher than risk disclosure by banks carrying out their 
activities in different States that are not “interventionist enforcement”. Consequently, 
qualitative risk disclosure by Italian banks is expected to be of use to investors.  
However, the systematic review of the multiple risk requirements issued by 
different regulators, acting at different hierarchical levels, revealed some limitations 
of current system of risk disclosure regulation.  
The analysis identified several lacks and/or gaps of regulation, which may explain 
the inadequacy of qualitative risk disclosure by Italian banks to reflect their actual 
riskiness, according to what has been revealed by recent empirical research 
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
29 
(Allegrini, 2011). In other words, as a result of the increasing in minimum regulatory 
requirements, the usefulness of risk related information has not increased.  
In this regard, the study attempts to provide some reflections on current risk 
disclosure regulation that may explain the (un)usefulness of risk disclosure revealed 
by recent studies, by referring to the  concept of usefulness to investor defined by the 
IASB as a function of comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability. 
What should be noted is that, despite the joint effort made to converge countries’ 
reporting standards (Macchioni, 2010), over years recommended by scholars 
(ICAEW, 2011; Zen e Baldan, 2007; Linsley e Shrives, 2006; ICAEW 2002), 
substantial differences in reporting regulation and practices still remain across countries. 
On the one hand, the high degree of discretion of current regulation does not allow 
Italian banks to achieve the comparability purposes. Also, it has been argued that the 
“principle-based” nature of IFRS implies the use of professional judgment, leading to 
non-comparable reporting practices (Oliveira et al., 2011; Leuz, 2010). On the other 
hand, the so-called “Basel Accords”, regarded as supervisory provisions specifically 
for the banking sector aiming at ensuring investors’ protection, needs to be endorsed 
by each State, thus reflecting the specificity of different home-country regulation, 
with inevitable effects on comparability of risk information. In addition, what should 
be remembered is that the Basel Committee, regarded as an organization aiming at 
promoting and encouraging international cooperation in the field of banking 
supervision, has no formal authority or a self-regulatory power and, therefore, does 
not issue principles and rules mandatory in nature, but suggest practical guidelines 
that are no legally binging.  
Consequently, the comparability of risk disclosure reflects the inefficiencies of 
current requirements due to the different disclosure choices allowed, which are 
unlikely to be understood fully because of non-alignment with what is the actual 
riskiness of the bank. Therefore, users do not know whether banks disclose bad or 
good news, and are likely to face considerable difficulty in comparing that profile 
across the sector.  
With reference to the achievement of the “understandability” purposes, there is 
need to underline that the vagueness and misleading nature of the statements may 
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lead to a potential increasing in multiple interpretations by readers. In this regard, 
previous research found that the understandability of narratives was poor, due to a 
general lack of qualitative information to explain in greater detail numerical 
disclosure (Allegrini, 2011; Fortuna, 2011). Therefore, users are likely to face 
considerable difficulty in capturing the appropriate risk profile of a credit 
institution, because not detailed information is usually given and, where given, is 
dispersed throughout the different document public available.  
Speaking in the IASB’s word, “verifiability helps assure users that information 
faithfully represents the economic phenomena (…). Verifiability means that different 
knowledgeable and independent observers could reach consensus, although not 
necessarily complete agreement, that a particular depiction is a faithful representation” 
(Framework, 2010, para QC26). In this regard, what should be remarked is that the 
guidelines issued by the different regulators, more or less prescriptive, enabling 
preparers of financial statements to manage information to be disclosed. More in 
depth, current regulatory requirements allowed insiders to manage the information 
that may reveal some reduction in the ability of the bank to create value in the future. 
Regarding the timeliness of risk disclosure, the Basel II requirements introducing 
higher capital requirements to capture the credit risk of complex credit activities. The 
introduction of such requirements was intended to promote the build up of capital 
buffers in good times, so that they could be drawn on in period of stress. In terms of 
disclosures, banks will be required to disclose information about their regulatory 
capital elements. However, the recent financial crisis has reveled the inefficiencies of 
financial regulation in defining e supervising risk disclosure practices.  
What should be emphasized is that the presence of a more enforced regulation 
does not eliminate certain degree of discretion and, therefore, does not necessarily 
represent a reason for higher information transparency (Dobler, 2005; 2011). Despite 
previous studies (Allegrini, 2011) have revealed that qualitative risk information by 
Italian banks reflects the application of minimum requirements of the different 
regulators, it is inadequate to describe the overall risk profile of the company. 
Hence, the inefficiencies of the qualitative risk disclosure provided by the Italian 
banks are due not only (or exclusively) to the enforcement mechanisms and does not 
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represent just a problem of compliance per se, but also shed some light on the 
existing limitation of current rules in terms of degree of detail, the pervasiveness of 
the information required. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
This study highlights some critical issues of the current risk disclosure regulation, 
with specific regard to the Italian banking sector. More in depth, this study provides 
a systematic overview of the complex apparatus of qualitative risk disclosure 
regulation, by referring to the primary and the secondary sources of law issued by 
different regulators.  
Through the analysis of the enforcement level and effectiveness of the legal 
constraints, we aim to shed light on the degree of discretion allowed by the above-
mentioned set of rules, and to discuss some potential effects in terms of 
comparability and faithfulness of risk disclosure. Hence, the analysis emphasizes the 
well-known call for a more systematic and effective set of rules for risk disclosure, 
also for such countries where the interventionist enforcement approach is applied.  
More in depth, the research suggests the introduction of a more effective strategy, 
shared by all EU members, for the adoption and the implementation of risk 
disclosure requirements, in order to fill the gap between the more general European 
regulatory framework and the different specific national guidelines. Moreover, a 
thoughtful reflection about the key elements to be introduced and/or strengthened in 
risk communication, and the opportunity to define a less comprehensive but more 
restrictive rules for companies, is recommended.  
On the basis of the above considerations, the contribution of this paper is twofold.  
The research aims at being relevant from a theoretical perspective, by contributing to 
risk disclosure literature through a critical analysis of the current regulation. 
Moreover, although the analysis refers to the Italian context, it addresses some 
critical issues relevant for other European and foreign countries presenting a similar 
enforcement system.  
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
32 
The study also provides some helpful suggestions for national and international 
standard setters, policy makers, and supervisory authorities, by highlighting some 
overlaps and/or lacks of the complex system of current risk disclosure regulation that are 
not able to enhance the usefulness of their risk information.  
In this way, the above theoretical considerations could represent a valid starting 
point to define some guidelines for discussing and re-defining the status quo of the 
current risk disclosure regulation.  
However, further research could try to test for risk disclosure with empirical 
evidence, by examining in detail the information provided by banks in different risk 
reports, in order to understand if the compliance with current regulation is able to 
enhance, in practice, the usefulness of risk disclosure.  
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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: the purpose of this research is to examine the risk disclosure provided by Italian banks, 
focusing on the characteristics of the information to assess the overall quality of disclosure, to find 
any differences between the two mandatory reports (notes to financial statements and the public 
report) both prepared in compliance with the instructions of the national supervisory Authority.  
Design: We carried out a content analysis on analysed a total of 66 financial statements and public 
reports 66 to investigate the variation in the level of risk disclosure between the two risk reports. 
Findings: Our findings show that although Italian banks formally comply with the Bank of Italy’s 
instructions, there is room for them to choose the characteristics of the information, with undeniable 
effects not only on the quantity of the disclosure provided in each report and for each risk factor, but 
above all, in terms of quality. 
Value: this research will complement prior studies by focusing on an under-researched setting, 
such as the banking sector, and providing evidences relating to a report which has never been analysed 
before. Also, focusing on the Italian banks, the study will allow us to take into account the issues 
relating to risk disclosure in a context characterized by increasing regulation, strong legal enforcement 
and, therefore, the expectation for more useful information. In addition, the findings of the paper will 
allow a more comprehensive analysis of the issues relating to risk disclosure, highlighting existing 
strengths and limitations, as well as the need for a systematic framework, shared at the European 
level, to ensure the usefulness of information. In the end, the results will be of interest also for 
standard setters and supervisory bodies, as the research will shed light on some overlaps of the two 
competing regulations. 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007, regulators have encouraged 
companies to enhance their narrative risk disclosure, requiring more information on 
different types of risk, to be provided in different mandatory reports (Frolov, 2007; 
Dobler et al., 2011). However, despite the continuous raising of the minimum 
requirements, when regulators do demand narrative information, they essentially fix 
what information should be reported, without clarifying how it should be provided. 
That said, there may be an expectation that companies, while formally complying 
with what a regulation requires, can use their discretion in the choices relating to how 
the information on risk is to be reported (Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Dobler, 2008; 
Bischof 2009). Consequently, the flexibility allowed by current requirements should 
be taken into account since they leave a certain degree of discretion regarding how to 
report information, and the characteristics of disclosure on different kinds of risk 
may reflect this. 
Recent findings show that companies do not generally provide adequate 
information on risk (ICAEW, 2002, 2011). In fact, such information, although indeed 
available, is generally not monetary or forward-looking, but is neutral, mainly 
descriptive and focused on financial risks (Helliar et al., 2002; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Dobler et al., 2011; Abraham et al., 2012; Mokhtar 
and Mellett, 2013). Furthermore, it is also irrelevant to risk assessment (Magnan and 
Markarian, 2011). It should be noted that research on risk disclosure is still limited 
and, since several questions remain unanswered, there is much room for investigation 
(Woods et al., 2007). The need to deepen current knowledge on such issues is 
becoming more relevant also because, as emphasised by Woods et al. (2009), 
substantial diversity in numerical and narrative disclosure still persists globally. 
 In this context, a fundamental problem is the technical complexity of the current 
regulation on risk disclosure, especially in the banking sector, which appears to be 
less successful than expected (ICAEW, 2011). Indeed, although regulation requires 
complex disclosures, it is recognised that they are not relevant to assessing the risk 
profile of banks, as initially intended.  
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Despite general consensus on the inadequacy of current risk disclosure, it could be 
of interest to further investigate in greater detail the above-mentioned issues in order 
to understand better the reasons why risk disclosure looks less useful than it ought to be.  
A first step is to look at the quality of information, as it is widely known that the 
poor quality of disclosure is a major problem, given its crucial role in determining 
the decision-usefulness of the information (ICAEW, 2011).  
Secondly, it is worth considering that narrative risk disclosure is not only a 
function of regulation per se but also depends on firm-specific factors (Dobler et al., 
2011). This is particularly relevant in the banking sector, where narrative disclosure 
on risks must be provided in different reports, on a number of different aspects, and 
with a varying degree of emphasis within each report. Consequently, and given that 
some flexibility is allowed, a second aim of this study is to understand what the 
bank-specific factors that may drive disclosure choices and the quality of the 
information are. 
Especially, in view of the foregoing considerations, the subject of this research is 
the mandatory narrative risk disclosure provided by Italian banks. The Italian setting 
is extremely relevant for the issues discussed due to the importance of the 
supervision of the Bank of Italy (Draghi, 2010). Indeed, Italy unlike other countries, 
such as the UK and Germany, adopts “interventionist enforcements” (Bischof, 2009), 
which are regarded as a critical tool for achieving the minimum disclosure 
requirements (Frolov, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011). Moreover, interventionist 
enforcement by the Bank of Italy refers to two mandatory reports (notes to the 
financial statements and the public report), which contain information on the same 
financial risks, but with varying degrees of detail regarding several aspects 
(Caldarelli et al., forthcoming).  
Given this context, we examine how risk information is provided by Italian banks, 
focusing on the characteristics of the information to assess the overall quality of 
disclosure, to find any differences between the notes to financial statements and the 
public report required by the third pillar of the New Capital Accord (henceforth, 
public report), both prepared in compliance with the instructions of the Bank of Italy.  
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Afterwards, an analysis is carried out to understand what the bank-specific factors 
that explain the level of quality of the narrative risk disclosure provided by Italian 
banks in the two above-mentioned reports are. 
The first step in the research is to detect the characteristics of disclosure and the 
differences between the reports. On the basis of the framework developed by Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2004) - who investigated the issues related to voluntary disclosure 
provided by Italian listed companies - suitably adapted to take into account the issues 
related to mandatory disclosure and the specificities of the Italian banking sector, our 
research involves observation of the presence/absence of a standard set of 
characteristics - along with the following semantic properties: type of measure, 
economic sign, outlook, nature and time frame - in each risk section of the 
aforementioned reports. The final sample is made up of 66 Italian banks. 
Then, we observe variables such as profitability, measures of risk, and governance 
features, to explain the level of quality of the disclosed information in the two reports 
examined. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
risk disclosure regulations. In Section 3, we assess the findings of previous studies 
and develop our hypotheses. In Section 4 we describe the research design and data 
sets. In Section 5 we present and discuss our results, and we provide our main 
conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. Risk disclosure regulation in Italy 
This section briefly reviews the main requirements of risk disclosure regulations 
in Italy, to highlight the level of discretion that they allow. It is worth noting that, to 
ensure the completeness of the discussion, we concisely summarize the demands of 
all the documents in which the information about risks is needed under current 
regulation. However, it should be borne in mind that the paper focuses on only two 
of the documents explained in the following paragraphs: the notes to financial 
statements and the public report. 
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2.1. The risk disclosure regulation for the notes to financial statements 
With particular reference to risk disclosure in the notes to financial statements, the 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: disclosures (as endorsed by Regulation EC n. 
1126/2008 and subsequently slightly amended by further regulations) requires 
information on the nature and extent of the risks that arise from financial instruments. 
It recommends quantitative and narrative information on credit risk, collateral and 
other credit enhancements, liquidity risk, market risk and sensitivity analysis, and 
other market risks. Nevertheless, no specific format is required or even suggested. 
What should be remarked is that the Italian banking sector is characterised by a 
high level of enforcement (Bischof, 2009), and accordingly decree-law n. 38 of 28 
February 2005 conferred on the Bank of Italy the jurisdiction to issue the 
administrative provisions to apply the IFRS in the banking sector. Consequently, 
further instructions were introduced in the form of Circular 262/2005 Bank’s 
financial statement: layouts and preparation (sic), which is periodically amended to 
account for changes in European Union accounting regulations, and Italian banks 
have to comply with these requests.  
Thus, with special regard to risk disclosure, unlike the IFRS 7, the Circular insists 
on a mandatory and specific format for the notes to financial statements. In addition, 
it also specifies that a section of the notes is to be organised in such a way as to 
provide quantitative and narrative information on credit risk, securitisation, interest 
rate risk and price risk, exchange risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. However, 
despite the greater degree of detail, the current requests for narrative information still 
leave room for discretion in relation to how this disclosure should be provided. 
In addition to the requirements for the notes to financial statements, Circular 
262/2005 also establishes that Italian banks should show “further information” in the 
management report not provided in the notes to the financial statements, regarding 
the aims and policies of their risk taking and the management of financial risks. 
Clearly, there is also room here for discretion in providing narrative information on 
risk. However, this report is not object of our investigation as the current legal 
provisions allow too much flexibility and freedom not only on how disclosure should 
be provided but also with reference to what should be disclosed. 
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2.2. The risk disclosure regulation for the public report 
The third pillar of the Basel Committee’s International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework (henceforth, Accord), as 
agreed by the European Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC of 14 June 2006, 
contains a large number of options for risk disclosure, and discretion that may be 
applied depending on the specific national circumstances. 
Since decree-law n. 297 of 27 December 2006 conferred on the Bank of Italy the 
jurisdiction to issue the administrative provisions, these directives have been 
transposed in Italy through Circular 263/2006 New regulations for the prudential 
supervision of banks.  
Circular 263/2006 adheres to the directives by requiring more general information 
on credit risk management policies and market risk than the original Accord. In 
particular, the Circular requires quantitative and narrative information on credit risk, 
counterparty risk, securitisation, market risk, operational risk, equities, and interest 
rate risk. It is worth noting that the directives have recently been revised to 
strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector, 
introducing a number of new requirements, such as securitisation exposure and the 
sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles. However, despite the undeniable 
improvements, also in this case, a high level of discretion persists, with regard to how 
the disclosure should be provided. 
 
3. Assessing prior research and developing the hypotheses 
A number of researchers have previously analysed the quantity and quality of 
corporate risk disclosure, in single or comparative national data settings, given the 
distinct nature of country-specific risk reporting regulations. Mainly drawing on 
ICAEW (2011), we now make an assessment of the most recent studies on risk 
disclosure, by specifically considering the papers that address the characteristics of 
narrative risk disclosure in both financial and non-financial companies, and also 
those with a clear focus on the effects of firm-specific factors. In so doing, we do not 
consider articles that examine the relationship between disclosure characteristics and 
market reactions, as these beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Our primary aim was to discover (if possible), i) the objectives of such research, 
ii) the regulations referred to, iii) the reports examined, and, iv) their findings, in 
order to shed some light on the state of the art, as well as to identify any areas 
requiring further research.  
As a first stage, we review here the most relevant studies that focus on the 
characteristics of narrative risk disclosure, but with no reference to any firm specific 
factors. With regard to narrative risk disclosure characteristics in the English-
speaking setting, Abraham et al. (2012) analysed the usefulness of the risk 
information disclosed by US listed companies in their annual reports. They found 
that risk information had increased as a result of regulatory initiatives, and it was 
acknowledged that regulation was effective in theory, but difficult to implement in 
practice because of unintended consequences. The analysis of narrative information 
showed that non-monetary disclosure was more common than monetary disclosure, 
only a small percentage of narrative disclosures related to the future, and the tone of 
such disclosure was mainly neutral. 
Marshall and Weetman (2002) studied mandatory narrative risk disclosure in 
compliance with SEC and ASB requirements in the annual reports of US and UK 
listed companies. They found two opposing forces, namely the regulator’s 
expectation for clarity and transparency versus the managements’ need to protect the 
entity. The study also showed that disclosure regulations could have a different 
impact in two different regulatory environments, despite their simultaneous 
development under similar sets of influences.  
Moving from the English-speaking setting to the Continental context, the majority 
of the research on the characteristics of narrative risk disclosure was carried out by 
focusing on Germany. Dobler (2005a) in particular discussed empirical evidence 
from Germany, emphasising how risk disclosure improved somewhat after firms 
were explicitly obliged to report on their risks, possibly due to a previous lack of 
experience and practice, vague disclosure rules, or poor enforcement. Moreover, 
Berger and Gleißner (2006) showed that in Germany, even under a mandatory 
reporting regime, there is still an information asymmetry in the risk information 
disclosed in the annual reports. 
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Dobler (2005b) also discussed national and international developments in the 
regulation of risk reporting involving German legislation, German standards, EU 
directives, and international and US standards, thereby providing a comparative 
international overview of mandatory risk disclosure and a perspective for 
international convergence. He made it clear that the existence of an international 
standard on risk reporting could enhance comparability among entities 
internationally, and there is some potential for convergence in risk reporting 
requirements. Dobler (2008) also adopted and reviewed discretionary disclosure and 
“cheap-talk” models in an attempt to analyse risk reporting incentives and their 
relationship to regulation. He linked restricted risk reporting with attempts to 
regulate, affirming that regulation may to some extent mitigate the effects of 
incentive-driven restrictions, but can nevertheless have adverse effects on risk 
reporting.  
Dobler et al. (2011) carried out a multi-country investigation of comprehensive 
corporate risk disclosure in annual reports. They analysed the attributes and quantity 
of risk disclosure and its association with the level of firm risk in US, Canadian, UK, 
and German settings. They found a consistent pattern, where risk disclosure was 
most prevalent in management reports, and concentrated on financial risk categories, 
including relatively little quantitative and forward-looking disclosure across the 
countries studied. 
In relation to the foregoing studies, focusing on the semantic properties of 
information, it is possible to highlight that their conclusions mainly refer to 
disclosure that is generally not monetary or forward-looking, but is neutral, mainly 
qualitative and focused on financial risks. Moreover, most of these studies also 
emphasise that risk disclosure characteristics are influenced by the degree of detail of 
regulation and enforcement. However, none of these studies concentrated on risk 
disclosure in different mandatory reports (multi-mandatory risk disclosure), nor did 
they take into account the reporting of different kinds of risks. Given the lack of 
evidence in the empirical research on multi-mandatory risk disclosure, and the 
distinguishing characteristics of the Italian accounting regulations, we test a set of 
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hypotheses mainly concerned with differences in the characteristics of risk disclosure 
between two reports, i.e. the notes to the financial statements and the public report.  
Thus, although taking for granted the characteristics of risk disclosure as 
previously stated, we argue that there can be a substantial effect on such information, 
in terms of differences between the reports, according to the regulatory requirements 
considered. Indeed, it is worth noting that, as explained in Section 2, the Bank of 
Italy’s instructions require selected, but less detailed risk disclosure in the notes, and 
selected and detailed risk disclosure in the public report. Hence, as argued by Dobler 
(2005a, 2008), Lajili and Zéghal (2005), and Dobler et al. (2011) discretionary 
disclosure might be more prevalent in notes to financial statements, and banks may 
emphasise mandatory risk disclosure in their public reports, which are enforced more 
strictly. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2, the regulation examined requires 
either disclosure for different categories of risk, or different disclosure on the same 
risk in both reports. Arguably, it is important to highlight that despite the mandatory 
requirements, regulation leaves room for discretion, not only in providing details on 
the source or on the management of the single risks (see Linsley and Shrives 2000; 
Lajili and Zéghal 2005; Dobler et al., 2011), but also with reference to the 
characteristics of disclosure of each single risk within that report. In this regard, it is 
important to highlight that the above studies agree on the fact that the discretion in 
the choices relating to how the information on risk has to be reported (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000; Dobler, 2008; Bischof 2009) can negatively affect the quality (and the 
usefulness) of disclosure.  
Accordingly, we formulate our first hypotheses as follows: 
HP1a The characteristics of narrative risk disclosure in the mandatory categories 
will differ in the notes to the financial statements and the public report. 
HP1b The quality of narrative risk disclosure will differ in the notes to the 
financial statements and the public report, and this depends on the different 
characteristics of the information for the mandatory categories. 
Further research has examined the characteristics of narrative risk disclosure, by 
also analysing the effects of firm specific factors. Especially, with reference to the 
US context, Campbell et al. (2012) analysed SEC-mandated firms which included a 
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section on risk factors in their Form 10-K. They examined the information content of 
newly created risk factor sections and offered two main findings. 
They found, firstly, that firms facing greater risk show more risk factors, and that the 
type of risk determines whether or not the firm devotes a greater portion of their 
disclosures to describing that risk type. On the other hand, the results of Campbell et 
al. (2012) supported the SEC’s decision to make risk factor disclosure obligatory, 
given that the disclosures in this newly created section appear to be firm-specific. 
Above all, they reported the significant influence of the following variables: size, 
leverage, auditor typology, taxation, and extraordinary items.  
Lajili and Zéghal (2005) analysed the risk disclosure provided by Canadian 
companies in the notes and management discussion, in accordance with the CICA 
handbook requirements. They found the risk information to be almost exclusively 
qualitative in nature, and its location in the reports followed Canadian risk disclosure 
regulations. Moreover, they showed a high degree of intensity for both mandatory 
and voluntary risk management disclosure. In their view the disclosure appeared to 
lack uniformity, clarity and quantification, potentially limiting its usefulness. They 
used size, leverage and profitability in their analysis to carry out an ANOVA test, 
and reported that these variables were not significant, recommending caution in the 
interpretation of results because this was probably also due to the fact that they 
considered companies from different sectors. 
In the UK, Linsley and Shrives (2006) explored risk disclosure in the annual 
reports of listed firms. They found that qualitative, forward-looking, and good-news 
risk disclosure were each more commonplace than their opposites. Their results 
suggested a positive relationship between risk disclosure quantity and size, while 
proxies for the level of firm risk, unlike Campbell et al. (2012), were insignificant or 
showed mixed results. Also, Linsley et al. (2006) analysed banking risk disclosure 
through an examination of the annual reports of a sample of UK and Canadian banks, 
creating a coding grid based on the risk disclosure categories as set out by the Basel 
Committee in the Pillar 3 (Market Discipline) consultative document of 2001. Their 
results suggested that there was no association between levels of risk disclosure and 
either bank profitability or the level of risk within the banks. However, they did find 
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a positive association between levels of risk disclosure and both bank size and the 
number of risk definitions, and there appeared to be no statistically significant difference 
in the risk disclosure levels of the Canadian banks compared with the UK banks.  
Linsley and Lawrence (2007) examined risk disclosures of companies within their 
annual reports. Tests were carried out to measure the level of readability of the risk 
disclosure, and to assess whether directors were deliberately obscuring information 
about bad risk. Their main conclusions related to the importance of the provision of 
transparent risk information to the marketplace, in order to enhance the clarity of 
published risk information. Abraham and Cox (2007) analysed the annual reports of 
listed companies and examined business risk, financial risk, and internal control risk 
disclosure in accordance with FRS 13 and the requirements of the Turnbull Report. 
They suggest that size and the characteristics of ownership and governance are 
determinants of the quantity of risk disclosure.  
In the Italian case, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) analysed voluntary disclosure in 
the reports of non-financial public companies, and concluded that the quantity of 
disclosure is not a satisfactory proxy for the quality of disclosure. They developed 
measures of the quality of risk disclosure, which reflect its different aspects. It is 
noteworthy that in their work they referred to quasi-voluntary disclosure, given the 
limited mandatory requirements. Their results showed that although firms provided 
formal disclosure, there was substantial non-disclosure regarding risk. Moreover, 
they showed that, in line with previous studies, size has a significant impact on the 
aspects in question. Thus, since previous studies on the analysis on firm-specific 
factors explaining the characteristics of risk disclosure report mixed results, we 
formulate the following hypotheses.  
HP2a The quality of the narrative risk disclosure is associated with profitability. 
HP2b The quality of the narrative risk disclosure is associated with the measures of risk. 
HP2c The quality of the narrative risk disclosure is associated with governance features. 
Note that, unlike previous studies, we do not hypothesise an association between 
the quality of the narrative risk disclosure and size, because size is used to calculate 
an index for the relative quantity of disclosure used to assess the quality of the 
narrative disclosure.  
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4. Research design and data sets 
4.1. The sample 
We examined all the Italian banks required to publish consolidated financial 
statements and full public reports. Hence, we removed from our sample: i) Italian 
banks belonging to a group; ii) branches of non-European Union banks as specified 
in a list by the Bank of Italy; iii) Italian banks not belonging to a group, if controlled 
by a European holding and if they have total assets of less than 10 billion euros. We 
also removed those banks that have been subject to mergers and acquisitions, and 
those banks not providing full public reports.  
We analysed a total of 66 financial statements and public reports, all issued in the 
year 2011. Our analysis refers to the year 2011, and we therefore have no concerns in 
terms of first-time application, because in that year the Circular 262/2005 Bank’s 
financial statement: layouts and preparation was adopted for the fifth time, and the 
Circular 263/2006 New regulations for the prudential supervision of banks was 
adopted for the fourth time. Moreover, in 2011 as a consequence of the financial 
crisis, public opinion exerted pressures on Italian financial intermediaries in terms of 
accountability requests and this arguably could have led Italian banks to pay greater 
attention to their disclosure.   
4.2. Method  
We used content analysis to investigate the variation in the level of risk disclosure 
between the notes to financial statements and public reports. This method involves 
the use of code words, phrases and sentences according to an established framework 
(Bowman, 1984). Content analysis is usually applied to archival data, and its aim is 
to infer the underlying meanings present in the texts being investigated (Smith, 
Taffler, 2000). Content analysis can allow researchers to go behind the text as 
presented and enable them to make valid inferences about hidden or underlying (and 
possibly unintended) meanings and messages of interest (Weber, 1990; Denscombe, 
1998). Content analysis is an important technique (Krippendorf, 2004), and is useful 
for examining data and facts measured via an underlying framework, distinguishing 
them from background noise. 
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4.2.1 Content analysis by disjunctive codifying 
We performed content analysis by selecting sentences as coding units. Milne and 
Adler (1999) argued that as a basis of coding, sentences are far more reliable than 
any other unit of analysis. Both Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) used sentences to codify risk disclosures. One drawback of using sentences as 
coding units is that a company’s writing style can influence the outcome of the 
disclosure measurement. Thus, if a firm decides to dilute its risk-related discussion 
thinly among a mass of other words, it may not be possible to detect the risk-related 
information at the sentence level of analysis (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). It is 
difficult to overcome this drawback, which therefore constitutes a limitation of the 
analysis. 
Because some criticism has been levelled at this method, due to the subjectivity 
that might affect the analysis (Linsley and Shrives, 2006), some validation is essential 
(Bowman, 1984). In particular, to increase the reliability of the coding, it was 
undertaken by a team of three people. Tests of reliability have been used elsewhere 
to check for consistency in coding (Milne and Adler, 1999; Beattie et al., 2004). 
Following discussion and interpretation of the analytical framework, the three 
researchers independently coded an initial sample of five reports. To overcome the 
problem of the subjectivity in content analysis, we chose a two-step strategy of analysis. 
The first step in the measurement of risk disclosure consists in the observation of 
the presence/absence of a standard set of characteristics in each examined section 
(disjunctive codifying). In this way, the collection of information from a textual 
source is less arbitrary because the researchers are not required to evaluate the 
intensity of a factor in each sentence. All they have to do is identify the sentences 
that contain a particular phrase.  
Like Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), we propose a framework for the analysis of 
risk disclosure characteristics that considers four dimensions: the nature of the 
required information, the economic sign attributed to the expectations, the type of 
measures used to quantify and qualify the expected impacts, and the orientation of 
the outlook of the communicated risk. We also include the time frame. 
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For each detailed requirement, we verify whether any information is disclosed or 
not. Where it is not disclosed, we verify whether or not this was due to the 
operational activities of the business. 
We use the following semantic proprieties: 
- Type of measure: financial, non-financial. 
- Economic sign: positive, equal, negative. 
- Outlook: hypothesis – expectation, programs, actions or decisions taken, actual state. 
- Nature: qualitative, quantitative, mixed. 
- Time frame: historical, future-oriented, intertemporal. 
The result of the coding process is a matrix B of binary variables associated with a 
weight matrix W containing the frequencies of the considered aspects measured in 
each section required in the notes to the financial statements and the public report (in 
terms of the number of sentences containing a particular aspect). The robustness of 
the approach used here was tested by measuring the response matching level of the 
coding, which was carried out by three independent researchers working on the same 
documents. By considering the responses of the researchers pairwise, we calculated 
mean values of inter-rater reliability π Scott’s index of 0.86, with values included in 
the range 0.84 – 0.89. A π value of 0.75 represents a satisfactory level of inter-rater 
reliability (Hackston and Milne, 1996). 
A further analysis of the coherence of the coding, which considered the 
simultaneous actions of the three researchers, was carried out using Bhapkar’s test 
(1966). Bhapkar’s test checks for marginal homogeneity for all categories 
simultaneously. The term ‘marginal homogeneity’ refers to the equivalence (lack of 
significant difference) of one or more of the row marginal proportions and the 
corresponding column proportion(s) in a contingency table between two categorical 
variables – in this case, row variable X is the adopted content coding and column 
variable Y is the distribution of the responses of the different researchers. For all the 
characteristics considered, the statistical outcome was not significant (considering a 
threshold of 0.1 for an I-type test error). We conclude that the coding of the three 
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researchers was concordant. We included the pilot banks in the analysis to avoid a 
reduction in the number of examined banks. 
 4.3. Measurement  
In order to identify what the bank-specific factors that explain the level of quality 
of the narrative risk disclosure are, we carried out a two-step process.  
First, drawing on Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), we attempted to evaluate the 
quality of the disclosure according to the dimensions of relative quantity, density, 
depth, and outlook profile. Afterwards, we used the following variables: profitability, 
measures of risk, and governance features to find out if these influence the quality of 
disclosure. Hence, the purpose of this sub-section is to clarify the measurement 
issues involved in the analysis. 
First, we explain the measurement issues related to the index for assessing the 
quality. In particular, quantity (the first dimension forming the overall quality index) 
is regarded as the absolute number of pieces of information disclosed, and has to be 
considered as a proxy of the amount of disclosure provided by banks. However, the 
literature emphasises that an absolute index (e.g., the number of phrases containing 
risk disclosure) is not adequate to appreciate the relative quantity of disclosure. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and Linsley and Shrives (2006) demonstrated that size 
is highly positively correlated to the total number of risk disclosures, the number of 
financial risk disclosures, and the number of non-financial risk disclosures. We 
measure size as total assets (widely used in literature) and equity (which has relevant 
implications for risk tolerance in the banking sector), both of which are shown in the 
balance sheets of the banks concerned. 
In line with these positions (Beattie et al., 2002) an OLS regression equation was 
estimated using as an independent variable, and an index for the relative quantity of 
disclosure is proposed, by using the normalized residuals of the regression as a proxy 
for the disclosure quantity. The regression model is the following:  
 (1) 
Afterwards, the relative quantity index (RQ) was calculated by using Eq. (2), as 
the difference between the observed disclosure  and the estimated disclosure , 
0 1
ˆ
i iD SIZE   
iD
ˆ
iD
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and then normalised between 0-1. 
ˆ
i i iRQ D D   
(2) 
Moreover, to assess the relevance that risk-related information assumes within 
each report, we also considered the weight it has inside the overall communication, 
understood as the density of disclosure. In this regard, we considered the potential 
effects of the style of writing, since relevance of risk information disclosed can be 
influenced by the extent to which it is diluted. Thus, in accordance with previous 
studies (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) we define density as the ratio between the 
number of sentences about risks and the total number of sentences included in the 
analysed documents as shown in Eq. (3). As a consequence, the value assumed by 
the DEN index is between 0 and 1 and increases as the relevance becomes higher. 
 
(3) 
where  is the density index for the i-th bank;  is the number of sentences 
in the report of bank i;  is a binary variable that assumes 1 if the sentence j in 
the report of bank i contains risk information and 0 otherwise. 
A third measure, as already highlighted, is the depth of disclosure, calculated by 
considering the economic sign used to communicate the expected performance, as 
shown in Eq. (4). 
 
(4) 
where  is the depth index for the i-th bank;  is the number of sentences in 
the report of bank i; , ,  are three binary variables that assume 
1 if the sentence j in the report of bank i contains a positive, equal or negative 
economic sign respectively and 0 otherwise. 
In the end, yet in line with Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) we considered the index 
for the outlook profile as it is shown in Eq. (5), which varies between 0-1 and 
assumes higher values when the company discloses information regarding actions 
taken or programs to face identified risks.  
1
1 i
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i ij
ji
DEN RFL
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ijRFL
 
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(5) 
where  is the outlook profile index for the i-th bank;  is the number of 
sentences in the report of bank i; , , ,  are four binary variables 
that assume 1 if the sentence j in the report of bank i contains an orientation about 
Hypothesis Expectation, Orientation about Programs, Orientation about Actions or 
Orientation about Actual State respectively and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, on the basis of the above-standardised indicesm a synthetic measure of 
the quality was calculated in accordance to the following equation (Eq. 6). 
 
(6) 
At this stage, we mainly focus on the measurement issues concerning the bank-
specific factors that may possibly influence the quality of disclosure. 
The first primary variable is related to the profitability measure. Linsley et al. 
(2006) explained that mixed results may be expected when testing for a profitability-
disclosure level association, but they also argued that banks that are better at risk 
management have higher levels of relative profitability, and therefore wish to signal 
their superior risk management abilities to the market. We measure profitability as 
ROE and earnings per share. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) emphasised that previous studies testing for a 
relationship between leverage (as a possible measure of risk) and disclosure produced 
no clear findings. Dobler et al. (2011) found leverage to be positively associated with 
the level of disclosure in the USA, but negatively associated with it in Germany. 
Here, we measure leverage using the debt/equity ratio. To account for the variability 
of disclosure due to the degree of risk faced by banks, we also use two specific 
variables strictly linked to bank risk-weighted assets (tier 1 and tier 2 capital ratios), 
as well as using external ratings. We took the values of tier 1 and tier 2 from the 
mandatory reports. We also verified the presence of an external rating in the 
mandatory reports, and its score. In addition, we analysed liquidity, which is 
generally used to assess the capacity of firms to meet their short-term financial 
 
1
1 i
k
i ij ij ij ij
ji
OPR OHE OP OA OAS
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obligations. As a proxy for liquidity, we retrieved quantitative information on credit, 
classified according to the Bank of Italy’s instructions, as past due, grounding, 
restructuring and outstanding. 
As far as governance features are concerned, we verified the listing status, 
because the degree of disclosure is predicted to be greater the more the company 
relies on the equity market (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). Listed companies have 
lower monitoring costs alongside greater disclosure. Although banks belong to the 
same industry, we verify whether narrative risk disclosure varies among the three 
different typologies of banks as regulated by the Italian law on financial 
intermediaries (Testo Unico Bancario), namely Limited banks (banca società per 
azioni), Popular banks (banche di credito popolari) and Mutual Cooperative banks 
(banche di credito cooperativo). It is worth noting that the main differences concern 
ownership structure and the governance model used. Thus, we measured the 
percentage of shares owned by the first two shareholders (Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007). We also verified the corporate governance model, classified as monistic, 
horizontal dualistic and vertical dualistic. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) highlighted 
the fact that corporate risk disclosure is still at the discretion of the board of 
directors, appearing more as a matter of voluntary disclosure than as a question of 
complying with regulations. Abraham and Cox (2007) specified that different types 
of board directors fulfill different functions, with both the number of executives and 
the number of independent directors being positively correlated with the level of 
corporate risk reporting. Thus, more disclosure may be expected from companies 
with a higher proportion of independent directors. We measured the percentage of 
independent directors and members of the audit committee. With respect to the 
Italian corporate governance regulations, we also verified the number of members of 
the supervisory board. Furthermore, since high profile auditing companies demand 
high levels of disclosure (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007), we also use a dichotomous 
variable to signal whether or not the audit company belongs to the ‘big 4’. 
5. Results 
The findings of the analysis are organised as follows. First, we examine the 
disclosure by risk factors; second, we compare the disclosure between the two 
reports examined on the basis of the above cited semantic properties, also focusing 
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on the association between risk factors and semantic properties; third we assess the 
overall quality of risk disclosure, by employing a multidimensional measure for the 
two documents. In the end, we use a regression model for disclosure quality to find 
out what the bank-specific factors that influence the quality of disclosure are. 
In the following tables we report the descriptive statistics for the risk factors for 
the notes to the financial statements (table 1a) and the public report (table 1b). 
Table 1a - Risk factors for the notes to the financial statements 
  Mean SD Range 
 Total Disclosure 84.8 37.6 0 – 222 
 Total Disclosure per content 14.3 6.27 0 – 37 
Content 
 Credit Risk 69.1 36.1 0 – 205 
 Exchange Risk 6.3 4.5 0 – 25 
 Interest Rate and Price Risk 39.4 26.9 0 – 124 
 Liquidity Risk 18.0 17.1 0 – 100 
 Operational Risk 16.2 11.4 1 – 58 
 Securisation 22.5 30.2 0 – 136 
 
Table 1 b - Risk factors for the public report 
  Mean SD Range 
 Total Disclosure 204.5 129.1 30 – 598 
 Total Disclosure per content 20.5 12.9 3 – 60 
Content 
 Risk mitigation techniques 15.0 7.5 0 – 26 
 Securitization transactions 11.4 3.9 0 – 16 
 Equity exposures 85.5 60.7 0 – 341 
 
Credit risk: general 
disclosures 
4.7 1.3 0 – 7 
 
Credit risk: disclosures for 
portfolios treated under IRB 
approaches 
2.0 6.1 0 – 27 
 
Credit risk: disclosures for 
portfolios treated under the 
standardised approach 
9.2 3.0 0 – 15 
 Counterparty risk 14.0 3.4 8 – 22 
 
Market risks 
Exchange risk and 
commodity risk 
1.3 5.3 0 – 25 
 Operational risk 5.6 1.8 0 – 12 
 
Interest rate risk on positions 
in the banking book 
11.4 3.9 0 – 16 
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In general, what should be noted observing the tables above is that, from a merely 
quantitative point of view, as the total disclosure per content index reveals, Italian 
banks devote more effort to the presentation of the information on risks required for 
the public report (on average 20.5 sentences per content) compared with those 
reported in the notes to financial statements (on average 14.3 sentences per content).  
However, looking at the two tables separately, with regard to the notes to financial 
statements, it is worth noting that the more relied upon risk factors are Credit Risk 
(69.1 sentences on average), Interest rate and Price Risk (39.4 sentences on average) 
and Securitisation (22.5 sentences on average). Focusing on the public report, the 
majority of the information aims to explain the issues related to Equity exposures 
(85.5 sentences on average). 
On the other hand, table 2 (below) allows us to compare the disclosure in the 
notes to the financial statements and in the public report on the basis of its semantic 
properties, to get a more comprehensive idea of the characteristics of the information 
reported in the two documents. 
Table 2 - Comparison between the notes and the public report 
  
Notes to the Financial 
Statements 
Public Report T test 
  Mean SD 
Ran
ge 
Mean SD Range P-value 
Semantic Properties        
Time 
frame 
Historical 1.9 2.7 0 – 13 1.4 4.7 0 – 47 0.496 
Future 0.3 1.5 0 – 11 0.2 0.6 0 – 3 0.396 
Intertemporal 13.1 6.8 0 – 39 20.9 15.1 5 – 72 <0.001*** 
Economic 
Sign 
Negative 0.1 0.4 0 – 2 2.3 2.1 0 – 15 <0.001*** 
Equal 9.2 7.3 0 – 41 37.0 21.8 3 – 133 <0.001*** 
Positive 5.6 5.7 0 – 24 5.7 9.8 0 – 48 0.987 
Type 
of 
Measure 
Financial 12.5 6.6 0 – 41 6.2 10.1 0 – 49 <0.001*** 
Not Financial 13.7 6.3 0 – 40 38.8 22.3 5 – 135 <0.001** 
   Nature 
    Quantitative 12.6 7.1 0 – 43 42.6 25.8 5 – 135 <0.001*** 
Qualitative 0.0 0.0 0 – 0 0.1 0.2 0 – 1 ---- 
Mixed 2.3 3.7 0 – 18 2.8 9.1 0 – 47 0.721 
Outlook 
orientation 
Hypotheses on 
Expectation 
0.7 1.8 0 – 13 2.9 5.8 0 – 27 0.007*** 
Programs 1.3 2.9 0 – 15 0.2 0.7 0 – 4 0.002*** 
Actions or 
decision taken 
8.1 6.6 0 – 24 6.9 9.9 0 – 51 0.441 
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Actual state 3.3 1.8 0 – 14 36.7 23.7 3 – 133 <0.001*** 
*Slightly significant 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1;  **Moderately significant 0.01 < p < 0.05;  *** Strongly significant p < 0.01. 
Concerning the time frame, both documents are affected by the prevalence of 
intertemporal information. In particular, the p-values highlight a strongly significant 
difference between the two reports considered, with more information disclosed in 
the public report.  
Also the p-values regarding the economic sign confirm the greater attention to the 
information disclosed in the public report. In both cases, however, there is a 
preference to disclose equal information.  
Moreover, while the amount of positive information is almost the same within the 
different documents, it is possible to identify a highly significant difference between 
the two reports, with more negative information disclosed in the public report rather 
than in the notes to financial statements.  
With reference to the type of measure, the two documents appear quite different, 
with the public report more prone to provide non-financial information.  
In terms of the nature of the information, there is a prevalence of quantitative 
disclosure, with a significant difference between the amount of information delivered 
in the notes to financial statements (on average 12.6 sentences) and in the public 
report (on average 42.6 sentences).  
In the end, concerning the outlook, the majority of the disclosure is focused on the 
actual state in the case of the public report, and on the actions/decisions taken in the 
notes to the financial statements.  
Significant differences can be detected between the reports in relation to the four 
items considered, with the public report divulging a greater amount of disclosure for 
all of them, except for the actions/decisions taken. 
In addition, in the following tables (3a and 3b; 4a and 4b), the relationship 
between risk factors and the economic sign as well as the type of measure is 
analysed. What emerges is an evident association in both cases (the Exact Chi-square 
test of association is statistically significant at the 1% level). 
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Table 3a - Risk factors by type of measure for the notes to the financial statements 
 Type of Measure 
Risk Factors Financial Non financial Total 
Credit Risk 
653 
49,6% 
664 
50,4% 
1317 
100% 
Exchange Risk 
20 
5,9% 
318 
94,1% 
338 
100% 
Interest Rate and Price Risk 
50 
28,4% 
126 
71,6% 
176 
100% 
Liquidity Risk 
15 
27,3% 
40 
72,7% 
55 
100% 
Operational Risk 
4 
7,0% 
53 
93,0% 
57 
100% 
Securisation 
28 
71,8% 
11 
28,2% 
39 
100% 
    
Statistics df Value P-value 
Exact Chi-square 5 271.47 <0.001*** 
Cramer V  0.14  
*Slightly significant 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; **Moderately significant 0.01 < p < 0.05; *** Strongly significant p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 3b - Risk factors by type of measure for public report 
 Type of measure 
Risk factors Financial Nonfinancial Total 
Risk mitigation techniques 
1 
0.5% 
198 
99.5% 
199 
100% 
Securitization transactions 
269 
39.3% 
416 
60.7% 
685 
100% 
Equity exposures 
15 
1.1% 
1387 
98.9% 
1402 
100% 
Credit risk: general disclosures 
0 
0.0% 
62 
100.0% 
62 
100% 
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios 
treated under IRB approaches 
0 
0.0% 
25 
100.0% 
25 
100% 
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios 
treated under the standardized approach 
0 
0.0% 
123 
100.0% 
123 
100% 
Counterparty risk 
118 
52.7% 
106 
47.3% 
224 
100% 
Market risks 
Exchange risk and commodity risk 
1 
5.6% 
17 
94.4% 
18 
100% 
Operational risk 
5 
6.5% 
72 
93.5% 
77 
100% 
Interest rate risk on positions  
in the banking book 
0 
0.0% 
151 
100.0% 
151 
100.0% 
    
Statistics df Value P-value 
Exact Chi-square 9 941,64 <0.001*** 
Cramer V  0.56  
*Slightly significant 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; **Moderately significant 0.01 < p < 0.05; *** Strongly significant p < 0.01. 
 
The above tables (3a and 3b) allow us to assess the association between risk 
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factors and type of measure for the two documents.  
With reference to the notes to the financial statements, there is a strong preference 
for non-financial information for all the risk factors, with the only exception of 
disclosure on securitisation, which is mainly financial. Also regarding the public 
report, it is possible to recognise a focus on non-financial information for all the risk 
factors considered, except for the disclosure on counterparty risk, which is 
characterised by a prevalence of financial information. 
Table 4a - Risk factors by economic sign for the notes to the financial statements 
 Economic Sign 
Risk factors Negative Equal Positive Total 
Credit Risk 
3 
0.4% 
446 
64.5% 
242 
35.0% 
691 
100% 
Exchange Risk 
2 
2.2% 
60 
65.9% 
29 
31.9% 
91 
100% 
Interest Rate and Price Risk 
10 
6.0% 
120 
71.4% 
38 
22.6% 
168 
100% 
Liquidity Risk 
0 
0.0% 
20 
36.4% 
35 
63.6% 
55 
100% 
Operational Risk 
2 
3.6% 
24 
43.6% 
29 
52.7% 
55 
100% 
Securisation 
1 
2.8% 
25 
69.4% 
10 
27.8% 
36 
100% 
     
Statistics df Value  P-value 
Exact Chi-square 10 65,72  <0.001*** 
Cramer V  0.03   
*Slightly significant 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; **Moderately significant 0.01 < p < 0.05; *** Strongly significant p < 0.01. 
 
Table 4b - Risk factors by economic sign public report 
 Economic Sign 
Risk factors Negative Equal Positive Total 
Risk mitigation techniques 
3 
1.5% 
156 
79.2% 
38 
19.3% 
199 
100% 
Securitization transactions 
23 
3.3% 
372 
53.2% 
304 
43.5% 
685 
100% 
Equity exposures 
0 
0.0% 
1389 
99.8% 
3 
0.2% 
1402 
100% 
Credit risk: general disclosures 
0 
0.0% 
61 
96.8% 
2 
3.2% 
62 
100% 
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios treated under 
IRB approaches 
1 
3.6% 
25 
89.3% 
2 
7.1% 
25 
100% 
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios treated under 
the standardized approach 
0 
0.0% 
123 
100.0% 
0 
0.0% 
123 
100% 
Counterparty risk 
123 
53.0% 
99 
42.7% 
10 
4.3% 
224 
100% 
Market risks 
Exchange risk and commodity risk 
0 
0.0% 
16 
94.1% 
1 
5.9% 
18 
100% 
Operational risk 
0 
0.0% 
67 
94.4% 
4 
5.6% 
71 
100% 
Interest rate risk on positions in banking 
book 
3 
2.1% 
131 
91.0% 
10 
6.9% 
151 
100.0% 
     
Statistics df Value  P-value 
Exact Chi-square 18 2051,62  <0.001*** 
Cramer V  0.59   
*Slightly significant 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; **Moderately significant 0.01 < p < 0.05; *** Strongly significant p < 0.01 
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The other tables (4a and 4b) provide other relevant evidence for the association 
between risk factors and economic sign in the two documents. In this regard, the 
notes to financial statements mainly show neutral information for all the risk factors 
considered, except for liquidity risk and operational risk, whose disclosure is mainly 
based on positive results. On the other hand, the results for the public report show 
that information is mainly neutral for all the risk factors, but not for the counterparty 
risk, which in the majority of cases is reserved for disclosing “bad news”. 
Apart from the issues relating to the amount and semantic properties of the 
information provided by Italian banks, we also attempted to assess the quality of the 
disclosure, from the perspective of the dimensions of relative quantity, density, 
depth, and outlook profile. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the four 
indices obtained from the analysis of the two documents were standardised according 
to Eq. (5) and the quality index was calculated from their arithmetic mean. The 
following table (5) shows the descriptive statistics of the four standardised 
components used to assess the quality of the disclosure, and the overall quality index. 
Table 5 - Normalised indices for assessing the quality of risk disclosure 
Risk disclosure 
charachteristics 
N Mean SD Range N Mean SD Range P-value 
Quantity 66 0.385 0.168 0 – 1 66 0.395 0.199 0 – 1 0.766 
Density 66 0.566 0.215 0 – 1 66 0.393 0.203 0 – 1 <0.001*** 
Depth 66 0.441 0.187 0 – 1 66 0.738 0.142 0 – 1 <0.001*** 
Outlook profile 66 0.390 0.179 0 – 1 66 0.351 0.145 0 – 1 0.180 
Quality 66 0.446 0.097 0.000 – 0.632 66 0.469 0.104 0.254 – 0.778 0.191 
*Slightly significant 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; **Moderately significant 0.01 < p < 0.05; *** Strongly significant p < 0.01. 
What emerges is that with reference to the indices for the relative quantity and the 
outlook profile, the analysed documents do not significantly differ from each other.  
However, the density of disclosure is significantly higher within the notes to the 
financial statements (56.6%) than in the public report (39.3%) where the disclosure 
on risks is more diluted. On the contrary, in terms of depth, the findings for the 
public report show a higher degree of depth (73.8%) than the notes to the financial 
statements. Moreover, what should be noted, is that the overall quality index does not 
significantly differ between the two documents, but is a little higher for the public 
report (46.9%) than for the notes (44.6%). 
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At this stage, it is important to verify to what extent the proposed index for quality 
of the documents depends on the factors identified in the literature as drivers of 
disclosure. The results of the regression models are presented in table 6. 
Table 6 - Regression model for disclosure quality  
 Notes to financial statements Public Report 
 
Parameter 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 
 
Parameter 
Standar
d Error 
P-value  
Intercept 0,764 0,123 <0,001 *** 0,457 0,073 <0,001 *** 
Auditors type: 
Big 4 
0,023 0,052 0,329 
 
0,101 0,058 0,043 ** 
Bank Type: 
Cooperative 
-0,071 0,040 0,039 ** 0,095 0,043 0,015 ** 
Governance: 
Traditional 
model 
-0,237 0,082 0,003 *** 0,037 0,063 0,281  
Number of 
Independent 
directors 
0,023 0,021 0,139 
 
-0,134 0,109 0,112  
Leverage -0,004 0,004 0,180 
 
-0,008 0,005 0,057 * 
Listing status: 
listed 
0,062 0,037 0,050 ** 0,045 0,047 0,171  
Number of 
members of the 
supervisory body 
-0,013 0,004 0,001 *** -0,010 0,004 0,007 ** 
Rating: A -0,018 0,035 0,304 
 
0,091 0,037 0,008 ** 
ROE 0,001 0,001 0,093 * -0,127 0,092 0,086 * 
Tier 1 0,017 0,007 0,013 ** 0,001 0,003 0,370  
         
 df F stats P-value  df F stats P-value  
Model 10 10.342 <0.001 *** 10 8,319 <0,001 *** 
Error 45    54    
Total 55    64    
Adjusted R2   0.453    0.365  
With reference to the notes to the financial statements, the findings show that 
quality increases as the ROE and TIER 1 increase and if the company is listed. 
However, the quality decreases if the banks adopt the traditional corporate governance 
model, if the number of members in the supervisory body increases, and also when 
they belong to the cooperative type. On the other hand, referring to the public report 
quality increases if the banks are rated A, if the auditor is one of the Big 4, and if the 
bank belongs to the cooperative type.  
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However, quality decreases as the ROE increases, if the number of members in 
the supervisory body increases, and as the leverage increases. What is interesting to 
highlight here is that despite the quality indices for the two documents not differing 
significantly (see table 5), there are different reasons for such levels of quality in the 
two reports. Also, it is worth emphasising that the regression model is able to explain 
a substantial part of the quality of disclosure. 
On the basis of the previous results, the HP1a (the characteristics of narrative 
risk disclosure in the mandatory categories will differ in the notes to the financial 
statements and the public report) is confirmed. Indeed, the two documents show 
peculiar semantic properties which, especially in relation to the type of measure and 
the economic sign, are also significantly associated with specific risk factors.  
With regard to the overall quality index there is no substantial difference, and 
HP1b (The quality of narrative risk disclosure will differ in the notes to the financial 
statements and the public report, and this depends on the different characteristics of 
the information for the mandatory categories) is not confirmed. In this regard, one 
could argue that there is no point in bothering banks to provide additional disclosure 
and to comply with two different requirements if there is no substantial difference in 
the degree of quality (and usefulness) of the information.  
However, insofar as we consider the single elements of the index, what emerges is 
that the density of disclosure is significantly higher within the notes to the financial 
statements than in the public report, while in terms of depth, the findings for the public 
report show greater depth than to the notes to the financial statements. This intuitively 
depends on the characteristics of the information in the different mandatory categories 
and, above all, signals a kind of complementarity between the two documents, which 
arguably serve two different purposes in terms of usefulness and (real) primary users. 
The HP2a (the quality of the narrative risk disclosure is associated with profitability) 
is confirmed, but the profitability measure (ROE) shows mixed effects on the quality 
of the two documents considered. This is quite intuitive in the notes and in line with 
the previous results (Linsley et al., 2006), which support the idea that banks that 
better manage risks have higher relative profitability, and wish to signal their 
superior ability to the market. On the contrary, the profitability measure has a 
negative effect on the quality of the public report.  
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Arguably, this is because if performance decreases, the management is encouraged 
to provide deeper explanations and a higher level of quality of narrative disclosure in 
the ad hoc risk report so as to indirectly justify the lower performance shown in the 
financial statements, and to clarify that this is not related to a change in the level of 
bank riskiness. 
With reference to HP2b (the quality of the narrative risk disclosure is associated 
with measures of risks), the results confirm the hypothesis and show coherent effects 
on the level of quality in the narrative risk disclosure in relation to the two 
documents. However, what should be noted, is that different risk measures have an 
impact on the quality of the information delivered in the notes to the financial 
statements and in the public report. As far as the first is concerned, TIER 1 positively 
influences the quality of disclosure probably because, as previously emphasised for 
the profitability measure, a high TIER 1 is a positive sign in terms of protection 
against unexpected loss, and the bank wishes to signal its superior ability to the 
market. With regard to the public report, the effect that the variable Leverage shows 
can be interpreted in the light of the fact that when it increases, the management is 
willing to deliver more accurate information and a higher level of quality of narrative 
disclosure in the ad hoc risk report to indirectly justify the higher leverage. 
Consistently, when the External Rating that is obtained is A, the management is 
highly motivated to further captivate the attention of the Rating Agencies and to 
further convince them of the positive situation of the bank, in order to preserve its rating. 
Notably, the best place to provide information to serve this aim is the ad hoc risk report. 
In regard to HP2c (the quality of the narrative risk disclosure is associated with 
governance features), the results confirm the hypothesis. In particular, it should be 
noted that the banks audited by one of the Big4 are more prone to provide higher quality 
information in the public report. This, in line with the above reasoning, is probably 
because the management privilege the ad hoc risk report to deliver all the 
information that the auditor can regard as useful for the assessment of the internal 
control system on which, by law, they have to express a judgement in addition to their 
audit function. Indeed, although the public report is not subject to audit, since this 
document results from the risk management system of the bank, debatably the quality of 
the public report is a proxy to evaluate the quality of the internal control system.  
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Consequently, those banks audited by one of the Big4 can rely on the ad hoc risk 
report to indirectly signal their abilities in managing risks in order to get better 
judgments regarding their internal control system. Moreover, as already highlighted, 
if the bank is a cooperative, the quality of the public report increases, but the quality 
of the notes to the financial statements decreases. This countervailing effect needs 
further explanations. In particular, one could argue that this is related to the legal and 
statutory requirements that characterise this type of bank in Italy. These kinds of 
bank are not listed and operate within a three-level network (local, regional and 
national), managed at the national level by Ferdercasse. A characteristic feature is 
that the network provides supervision and support for the cooperative banks, which 
carry out their activities mainly for their members.  They are strongly rooted in the 
territory and aim to contribute to the economic, social and environmental 
development of the local community. Also, these banks cannot invest in speculative 
projects and are driven by principles of mutuality. It is worth noting that, as the Bank 
of Italy has recently recognised, the cooperative banks usually have good internal 
control systems, thanks to the cited systemic and networking relationships that 
characterise their model. Accordingly, and in line with the above discussion, it is 
reasonable to expect that disclosure on risk is provided with a greater degree of 
quality in the ad hoc risk report, rather than in the notes to the financial statements, 
because the former benefits in terms of its structure and object from the good quality 
of the internal control system that the networking relationships of the cooperative 
banks are able to ensure. 
In corroboration of the previous results, listed banks tend to disclose high quality 
information on risk in the notes to the financial statements in order to signal to the 
financial markets and investors their superior ability in managing risk.  
With reference to the governance, model the findings show that the quality of risk 
disclosure in the notes to the financial statements decreases if banks adopt the 
traditional governance model. This can probably be interpreted by taking into 
account the fact that in the banks that switched to the other governance models, there 
is stronger supervision on the board of directors that, consequently, wish to signal 
through the financial statements its superior ability in managing risks with positive 
effects on performance. 
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In the end, for both documents, there is a negative effect on the quality of 
information if the number of the members of the supervisory body increases. What 
can be argued is that when the bank perceives deficiencies and weaknesses in its 
internal control system, it can try to hide this situation by employing an increasing 
number of subjects in the supervisory body.  
However, the presence of a greater number of individuals cannot solve the 
problems relating to the cited weaknesses of the internal control system, which are 
consequently reflected in a lower quality of information.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the issues relating to mandatory narrative risk disclosure, 
moving from the criticisms raised over the last few years by many academics and 
practitioners, sharing the view that current risk disclosure is inadequate and not 
useful for decision-making. In our view this topic deserved further attention to 
understand better the reasons why risk disclosure looks less useful than it ought to 
be. The peculiarities of the Italian banking sector regulation lead us to examine the 
banks’ risk disclosure focusing on the differences between the notes to the financial 
statements and the public report. This allowed us to have a more comprehensive idea 
of the impact that discretion permitted by current regulation has on risk disclosure 
and its quality.  
Our findings show that although Italian banks formally comply with the Bank of 
Italy’s instructions, there is room for them to choose the characteristics of the 
information, with undeniable effects not only on the quantity of the disclosure 
provided in each report and for each risk factor, but above all, in terms of quality. In 
this regard, our findings help to elucidate these aspects by highlighting what are the 
bank-specific factors that explain the different degree of quality between the reports.  
The interesting aspect to underline is that despite the different semantic properties 
of disclosure in the two reports – a natural consequence of the content of regulation – 
nevertheless, the degree of quality is almost the same, and certainly not completely 
satisfactory.  
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A possible reason for the poor quality can be ascribed to the existence of overlaps 
of the two competing regulations that, despite requiring different information to 
satisfy specific aims, request the preparation of two different reports on the same 
risks and risk factors. This creates the premises to push banks to provide different 
information, in different ways, and in different reports, looking for expected possible 
benefits. 
It is worth noting, that the interpretation of our results needs to encompass a 
broader perspective, taking into account the issues related to the need for a more 
coordinated effort by regulators, to possibly limit such overlaps, with the aim of 
avoiding banks to promoting a report or a section to the detriment of specific 
requirements, and opting for risk disclosure characteristics that mask their own risk 
profile. In addition to the above-mentioned overlaps, the low quality of disclosure, 
rendering it less useful than it ought to be, may also be explained with reference to 
some gaps (in terms of degree of detail or source of information) in the regulatory 
requirements, that need to be carefully heeded by regulators. 
In this view, we can conclude that the significance of this study goes beyond the 
debate taking place in the academic arena, since it can be largely relevant for those 
responsible for setting international and national accounting standards, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, and the domestic supervisory authorities, 
particularly concerning the possible introduction of requirements that are more 
explicit and detailed than the existing ones. Yet it is also important for those who 
prepare and audit financial reports, who may benefit from the deeper understanding 
needed to comply with current mandatory requirements. 
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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: The aim of this research is to explore how Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) can lead 
businesses to achieve their economic and social purposes.  In order to focus this analysis, we are going 
to look at the credit cooperative banking sector, which is especially conducive to social and 
responsible business conduct. 
Design: To deepen our understanding of how such banks can deal with risk issues, we provide an 
in-depth study of one credit cooperative bank.  
Findings: This research shows how ERM practices enable credit cooperative banks to make 
profits by supporting the economic and social development of local territories.  
Value: This research provides both a theoretical contribution and practical contribution, addressing 
new trends in enterprise risk management and giving some insights for similar banks on how to 
manage risk to achieve the growth of the local community.  
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1. Introduction 
During the last few years an increasing number of voices have urged that we pay 
more attention to business ethics in international business, on the grounds that not 
only are all large corporations now internationally structured and thus engaging in 
international transactions, but that even the smallest domestic firm is increasingly 
buffeted by the pressures of international competition (Barbu and Vintilà, 2007). 
This approach is necessary at present because calls have been made for the 
introduction of ethical consideration into firms’ activities as well as in their decisions 
making processes (de Graaf, 2006). To this purpose, the market must have the ability 
to transmit ethical demands to firms and to do so, two conditions must be met: 
individuals who have an ethical concern must take part in the market and have 
sufficient resources to transmit a clear and strong message to firms (Brickley et al., 
2002). In this regard, it has been argued that the banking system could fulfil these 
two conditions and can generate ethical engagements, not only for itself and for its 
customers, but also for society through achievement of social purposes (de La 
Cuesta-Gonzàlez et al., 2006) 
However, the recent financial crisis has shown relevant failures of traditional large 
banks (Linsley and Slack, 2012), revealing substantial weaknesses in their enterprise 
risk management [ERM henceforth] practices (Paape and Speklè, 2012; Magnan and 
Markarian, 2011; Power, 2009). It has to some extent damaged consumer confidence 
and levels of trust in business (European Commission, 2011). As a result, there is an 
increasing demand for fully integrating social and ethical values into enterprise risk 
management practices, in order to strengthen the holistic system for managing 
uncertainty as well as increasing the stakeholder value protection. This call for 
increasing attention to international business ethics and Enterprise Risk Management 
Practices has been answered by a slowly growing collection of academic 
(Demidenko and Mc Nutt, 2010; Weitzner and Darroch, 2010) and practitioners 
(Institute of Internal Auditors, The Global Association of Risk Professionals, the 
Institute of Risk Management), who have begun to address issues in this field.  
It should be noted that, despite a growth in the interest paid to the issues of 
business ethics and holistic risk management practices, there is a lack of description 
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about the relationship between business ethics and Enterprise Risk Management in 
practice. Does business ethics support ERM or does ERM support business in 
pursuing ethical purposes? 
The aim of this research is to explore how ERM can lead businesses to achieve 
social and ethical purposes.  In order to focus this analysis, we are going to look at 
the mutual credit cooperative banking sector, which is especially conducive to ethical 
and responsible business conduct (European Commission, 2011). Mutual credit 
cooperative banks are a particularly suitable basis for studying the relationship 
between business ethics and ERM due to the fact that they aim to achieve strong 
social purposes. Recent literature defines such banks as “ethical banks” (San Jose et 
al. 2011) since they have a twofold purpose: as financial intermediaries, they have to 
achieve an economic profitability to meet the members’ needs but, at the same time, 
they operate to promote social development of the local community. To this end, 
they have to provide funding to local businesses, which are frequently more risky 
than firms that large banks are prepared to fund.  
To deepen our understanding of how such banks can deal with risk issues and how 
ERM can be organized in order to balance the need for funding small businesses 
(usually quite risky) and the need to promote the economic and social development 
of local community, we provide an in-depth study of one mutual credit cooperative 
bank.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elucidates the 
conception of business ethics that we adopt for the purposes of our analysis. Section 3 
assesses prior research on the issues related to business ethics and ERM. Section 4 
describes the research method. Section 5 focuses on the case study. The last section 
concludes the study and discusses the implications of the analysis, addressing some 
further developments. 
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2. Conception(s) of Business Ethics  
This section aims to clarify how business ethics is conceived and to elucidate the 
conception of business ethics that we adopt for the purposes of our analysis. Hence, 
the ambition is not to provide an exhaustive and comprehensive review of the 
different conceptions of business ethics, but our goal is simply to outline briefly the 
notion of ethics to which we refer. 
In this regard, despite the significant growth in attempts to formalize or, more 
accurately, state what business ethics means, there is no unique and commonly 
accepted definition of ethics. Furthermore, the issues related to the practical 
fulfilment of ethical values are still vague, and therefore how business ethics 
practically works within organizations still remains in question.  
What should be noted is that the vagueness of the concept of business ethics has 
lead to a number of contributions over the years. Some people define business ethics 
as an element embraced in the broader conception of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), linking the concept of business ethics with the issues of CSR (see for 
example Carroll, 1999; Epstein, 1987; Votaw, 1972; Garriga and Mele, 2004; de la 
Cuesta-Gonzàles et al., 2006). In this regard, the European Commission states that 
‘to fully meet their corporate social responsibility, enterprises should have in place a 
process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer 
concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with 
their stakeholders, with the twofold aim of maximizing the creation of shared value 
for their owners/shareholders and for their other stakeholders and society 
and identifying, preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts (European 
Commission, 2011). Carroll specifies that “the social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society 
has of organizations at a given point in time”. He also states that ethics is not 
inconsistent with the logic of economic profit as profitability is a conditio sine qua 
non for business, in order to ensure its efficiency and effectiveness. In this 
perspective, the legal requirements represent ‘the rules for the game’, while the 
‘ethical responsibility’ is the kinds of behaviors and ethical norms that society 
expects businesses to follow, and this encompass behaviors and practices that are 
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beyond what is simply required by the law. Likewise, Garriga and Melè (2004) in 
their study aimed at mapping CSR theorizing, identify among other things a group of 
“ethical theories”, based on the ethical responsibilities of corporations to society 
(such as the Common Good approach, the Stakeholder theory, The Human Rights 
approach and  Sustainable Development), which they regard as useful in providing 
foundations for the concept(s) of CSR. 
However, a different strand of literature (San Jose, 2011; Viganò and Nicolai, 
2006; Choi and Jung; 2008; Bowie; 1999) has highlighted that business ethics should 
not be considered as merely a component of CSR, because it is a much broader 
concept. In this regard, it has been argued that the ethical nature of entities goes 
further than the conception of Corporate Social Responsibility.  
CSR can be referred at as a “self-regulating mechanism whereby companies 
integrate ethical, social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European 
Commission, 2011). This implies that, in some cases, socially responsible entities 
may direct their activities towards the achievement of social and ethical concerns. 
However, it does not necessarily imply a specific ethical commitment around 
decision making-process. In this regard, it has been argued (Arthur et al., 2007) that 
the problem of CSR lays in the fact that it is too often played out on the periphery of 
companies where it cannot influence the profit-driven decision making of the core 
business. On the contrary, the ethical nature of entities is strictly related to the 
existence of a direct ethical commitment within the organization, which is able to 
pervade all the aspects in the decision-making processes. Business ethics meets 
firms’ activity not only in their actions, but also in the actions of their subsidiaries 
and significant partners (San Jose et al., 2011). 
For the purposes of our analysis, we are going to refer to this latter strand of 
literature in approaching our discourse on business ethics because it fits more closely 
with the social and ethical purposes of mutual credit cooperative banks. That is, we 
regard business ethics as something that goes beyond the corporate social 
responsibility of the entity, by permeating the culture of the entity itself and every 
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operation carried out, as it is consistent with the way in which ethical banks view 
their purposes. 
However, the nature of business ethics is not well defined in literature. The 
concept of business ethics is frequently related to the ethical values of the managers 
involved in decision-making process. Some authors argue that business ethics is 
concerned with the moral philosophy, values and norms of behaviour that guide a 
corporation’s behaviour within society (Francis and Armstrong, 2003). Parker (1998) 
defines the end-point of business ethics as the moment where judgments are 
translated into some kind of practices: this is the point where ethics can determine 
behaviour. In this regard, different lists of ethical values have been provided (see 
Francis and Armstrong, 2003). However, it has been argued that ethical principles 
are not universally constituted across time and space (Neimark, 1995) but they 
should be adaptable in any situation irrespective of its complicated or inflexible 
nature (McNutt and Batho, 2005). 
In order to provide a philosophical underpinning, we mainly build our conception 
of business ethics on the idea that businesses do not need an “ethics of their own” 
(Moriarty, 2005), since business ethics has a solid foundation in political philosophy. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the central problems of political philosophy mirror the 
central problems of business ethics and, in this view, businesses can draw on 
principles already constructed by political philosophers, suitably adjusted for the 
differences in voluntariness and toughness between states and business (Moriarty, 
2005). 
Accordingly, our main reference is the revision of the Kantian approach
4
 provided 
by Bowie (1999), who highlighted the rich implications that Kant’s moral philosophy 
has for business practice. In Kantian terms we can view profits as a consequence of 
good business practices (from a broader perspective) rather than as the goal of 
                                                          
4 Kant regarded the “categorical imperative”, intended as a requirement of reason binding on all rational beings, as the 
fundamental principle of ethics.  Although Kant spoke of “the” categorical imperative, he formulated it in many ways. Most 
commentators focus on three formulations: 
1. Act only on maxims, which you can will to be universal laws of nature. 
2. Always treat the humanity in a person as an end, and never as merely a means. 
3. So act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which you were both subject and sovereign at the same time. 
Kant believed that only human beings can follow laws of their choosing (i.e. act rationally). Human beings are the only 
creatures that are free, and it is the fact that we are free that enables us to be rational and moral. The ethical person is the person 
who acts from the right intentions. We are able to act in this way because we have free will. (Bowie, 1999) 
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business. The main idea is that attention to issues other than profits (e.g. a 
meaningful work for employees, a democratic work place, non-coercive relationship 
with suppliers, meeting with social needs) paradoxically has the potential to enhance 
the profits: i.e. profits can be enhanced if a manager focuses on respecting the 
humanity of all the stakeholders.  
Therefore, we refer to the framework developed by Bowie in order to apply 
Kantian ethics to the organizational design of a business firm. This framework is 
informed mainly by the following principles (1999): 
1. The business firm should consider the interests of all the affected 
stakeholders in any decision it makes.  
2. The firm should allow those affected by the firm’s rules and policies 
to participate in the determination of those rules and policies before they are 
implemented.  
3. It should not be the case that, for all decisions, the interests of one 
stakeholder automatically take priority.  
4. When a situation arises where it appears that the interests of one set of 
stakeholders must be subordinated to the interests of another set of 
stakeholders, that decision should not be made solely on the grounds that 
there are a greater number of stakeholders in one group than in another.  
5. No business rule or practice should be adopted which is inconsistent 
with the first two formulations of the categorical imperative. (Each member 
of the organization stands in a moral relationship to all the others and the 
managers of a business firm should respect the humanity in all the persons in 
the organization) 
6. Every profit-making firm has a limited, but genuine, duty of 
beneficence.  
7. Every business firm must establish procedures designed to ensure that 
relations among stakeholders are governed by rules of justice.  
This set of principles, derived by Bowie (1999) for applying the Kantian ethics to 
businesses, provides the basis on which we will discuss the case study later in the paper. 
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3. Enterprise Risk Management: an overview 
Enterprise Risk Management is defined as “a process, affected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, 
and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives” (COSO, 2003:6). According to 
Mikes (2009), this definition of ERM sounds very similar to the widely used 
definition of management control provided by Antony (1965). In particular, due to 
the emphasis on the strategic features and purposes of ERM, it can be regarded as a 
strategic management control system, which helps an entity to get to where it wants 
to go and to avoid pitfalls and surprises along the way (Collier, 2009). It should be 
noted that the premise of enterprise risk management is that every entity exists to 
provide value for its stakeholders. All entities face uncertainty, and the challenge for 
management is to determine how much uncertainty to accept as it strives to grow 
stakeholder value (COSO ERM, 2004). In order to increase value for their 
stakeholder, it has been argued that businesses today need to fully integrate ethical 
and social values into their risk management practices (European Commission, 
2011). 
 
In this regard, the existing literature on ERM has emphasized the importance of 
the internal environment for the appropriate implementation of an ERM system in a 
particular organization (Gordon et al, 2009; COSO ERM 2004) and that this is very 
likely to vary from firm to firm. The suggestion that there is no universally ideal 
ERM system is quite intuitive and has been suggested elsewhere (e.g., The Financial 
Reporting Council’s Report, 2005; Beasley et al., 2005; Moeller, 2007). In this 
regard, a number of contributions have studied the details of enterprise risk 
management practices in specific organizational settings (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 
2009; Wahlstrom, 2009; Woods, 2009). It has been argued that, for an effective 
ERM, companies must look beyond the technology and establish a culture of risk 
management throughout the organization, permeating its existing practices and the 
individual behavior of managers in everyday decisions (Mikes, 2011).  For instance, 
Arena et al. (2010), emphasizing the "context specific" and "highly organizationally 
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dependent" nature of enterprise risk management, have confirmed the continually 
evolving mutual interaction between ERM and other pre-existing risk management 
practices. Woods (2009) reports significant variety at the operational level of the 
ERM system within a single large public sector organisation. With particular 
reference to the banking sector, Mikes (2009), through the analysis of two large 
banks, concludes that systematic variations in ERM practices exist, even within a 
single industry setting.  
 
After the recent financial crisis, banks need to strengthen their risk management 
practices taking into account social and ethical needs in order to support sustainable 
development and to improve stakeholder value protection (Magnan and Markarian, 
2012). However, despite calls having been made for more responsible behaviour by 
financial institutions (European Commission, 2011), there is a lack of descriptions of 
how banks operationalize enterprise risk management practices in order to achieve 
their economic, social and ethical purposes.   
 
It is widely accepted that Enterprise Risk Management is a key component of 
corporate governance (Demidenko and Mc Nutt, 2010). It provides a means of 
attaining an entity’s objectives by monitoring performance of (say) an agent by a 
principal and assuring that the principal’s (i.e., the stakeholder) interests are met via 
the diligent and efficient behaviour of the agent (the entity). One of the challenges 
associated with ERM implementation is determining the appropriate leadership 
structure to manage the identification, assessment, measurement, and response to all 
types of risks that arise across the enterprise (COSO ERM, 2004; Nocco and Stulz, 
2006). To respond to this challenge, many organizations are appointing a member of 
the senior management team to oversee the enterprise’s risk management process. 
Some authors such as Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and Beasley et al. (2008) rely on 
data on Chief Risk Officer appointments as their sole indicator for ERM adoption, 
arguing that the appointment of a chief risk officer is being used to signal both 
internally and externally that senior management and the board is serious about 
integrating all of its risk management activities under a more powerful senior-level 
executive (Lam, 2001).  
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There is a prevailing view that an ERM initiative cannot succeed, because of its 
scope and impact, without strong support in the organization at the senior 
management level, with a direct reporting line to the chief executive officer or chief 
financial officer. Senior management leadership of ERM helps to communicate and 
integrate the entity’s risk philosophy and strategy towards risk management 
consistently throughout the enterprise (COSO ERM, 2004). However, it has been 
recently underlined (Paape and Speklè, 2012) that there is no evidence that the 
application of the COSO framework improves risk management effectiveness, nor 
that support for a mechanistic view on risk management is implicit in COSO’s 
recommendations on risk appetite and tolerance. On the other hand, several semi-
regulatory bodies (Casualty Actuarial Society Committee on Enterprise Risk 
Management 2003; Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission 2004) and professional associations (Institute of Internal Auditors, The 
Global Association of Risk Professionals, the Institute of Risk Management, 
European Commission) are trying to standardize and codify the so-called best 
practices and, in so doing, have emphasized the importance of a strong ethical 
commitment in the holistic management of risk.  In this regard, the recent literature 
(e.g. Demidenko and McNutt, 2010; Drennan, 2004) has attempted to identify a link 
between corporate governance, ethics and ERM, considering ethics as a key element 
of corporate governance and highlighting that an effective ERM is based on the 
ethical governance of risk. They argue that Enterprise Risk Management is a key 
component of the ethics applied in corporate governance. This has developed into a 
philosophy to assist organizations within the process of protecting shareholders’ 
value while also increasing the bottom-line profitability. However, the question of 
how organizations with a governance structure based on ethics ‘do’ Enterprise Risk 
Management still remains unanswered. 
On the other hand, a number of studies address the effects of ERM adoption on 
firms’ performance (Beasley et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 2009). By adopting a 
systematic and consistent approach to managing all the risks confronting an 
organization, ERM is predicated to lower the firm’s overall risk of failure and thus 
increase the performance and, in turn, the value of the organization (Gordon et al, 
2009). In this regard, Gordon et al. (2009) identified five specific firm factors 
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(environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm complexity, firm size, and 
board of directors’ monitoring) that are believed to have an impact on the ERM-firm 
performance relation. The purpose of the analysis in this paper is to clarify how ERM 
enables a particular kind of banks to achieve their performance and profitability 
targets. In particular, it has been argued (Demidenko and McNutt, 2010) that ERM 
represents a tool to ensure financial stability as well as to achieve social profitability. 
However, there is no in-depth analysis of how the ERM allows social banks to 
pursue their economic, social and ethical purposes.   
 
Our analysis aims to answer the following research questions: 
 How do credit cooperative banks operationalise ERM? 
 How does the governance structure of credit cooperative shape ERM? 
 How does ERM allow credit cooperative banks to pursue their 
economic and social purposes?  
 
4. Research design 
To address the research questions, we are going to look in detail at the specific 
case of a mutual credit cooperative bank in order to understand how business ethics 
shapes the practice of ERM (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007; Scapens, 1990).  
 
We refer to the case of Banca di Credito Cooperativo (BCC) di Napoli, the main 
mutual credit cooperative bank within the Neapolitan region. Since this region is an 
underdeveloped area in a developed country, this case study is of relevant interest, 
aiming to deepen our understanding of how to encourage the economic and social 
growth in areas that need not only financial investment, but also social investments 
for their growth.    
 
The analysis of the case study is based on both, the internal and the external 
environment of BCC di Napoli. Hence, we use internal sources (interviews with the 
managers and internal documents, not usually available to the public) and external 
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sources (all reports published by the company, newspaper articles and other public 
coverage of the company).  
 
As the primary source of information, we rely on interviews with the Chairman 
and the Board of Directors, since they are responsible for achieving the ethical 
purposes of the bank. We also rely on interviews with other top managers, i.e. the 
risk management team and with credit risk controllers, as they are directly involved 
in enterprise risk management processes. In addition, we interviewed 2 clients that 
have been closely involved in particular investment projects. In sum, we collected 20 
in-depth interviews, each between two and two and a half hours in length. The 
following table 1 provides the list of interviewees. 
 
Table 1: The interviews 
INTERVIEWEES’ 
FUNCTIONAL POSITION 
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES 
FOR EACH POSITION 
Chairman and Board of Directors 3 
General Directors 2 
Director of Legal & Compliance 1 
Financial Accounting Division 1 
Risk Controller 1 
Risk Management team 3 
Chief Credit Officer 1 
Credit risk controller 2 
Financial Officer 2 
Department of Accountability and 
Transparency 
1 
Head of Branch 1 
Clients 2 
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As there is no clear theoretical link between business ethics and ERM, we wanted 
to keep the interviews open and so we used semi-structured questions. These semi- 
structured questions provided a number of key topics to be discussed during the 
interview, rather than representing literal questions to be asked of interviewees. 
These interviews were used to gather information on the ethical principles of the 
bank, and how and to what extent these ethical principles can influence the banking 
activity. We also asked for information about the how this bank is able to balance 
economic profitability and social needs and, in doing this, the role played by ERM. 
The interviews were recorded and then transcribed for analysis. Telephone follow-up 
with the respondents was conducted where issues were unclear or missing.  
 
During the interviews, we collected many relevant internal documents as well as 
specific data that would help us to learn about the risk management process, and 
corroborate the interview responses. These documents included a complete set of the 
procedures of BCC di Napoli, comprising, summaries of risk management 
procedures, strategic plans, and other related matters. Public information about the 
company was used as an additional source of information. 
 
The following table lists the external and internal documents to which we 
referred.  
 
Table 2: External and Internal documents 
  EXTERNAL DOCUMENTS INTERNAL DOCUMENTS 
Regulation of Credit Cooperation Strategic Plans (2009-2015) 
Chart of Values  Operational Plan  
Chart of Cohesion General Regulation Statement 
Chart of Finance 
Internal procedure  
on management of savings 
Social Reporting of the Credit 
Cooperation 
(Bilancio Sociale  
Riskiness Measure Report 
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e di Missione del Credito 
Cooperativo) 
Financial Statements 2011-2010 Internal procedure on lending process 
Newspaper Articles (Il Sole 24 Ore) Credit risk reporting 
 Liquidity Monitoring 
 Asset management and  
Liability Management Process 
 Audit Plan 
 
In order to collect other evidence we had the opportunity to attend some important 
corporate meetings, since one member of the research team is a member of the 
bank’s Supervisory Committee. Attendance at such meetings allowed us to collect 
informal evidence on the corporate environment, and made us aware of personal 
relationships between the different members of the board. In this regard, it should be 
noted that we benefited from very good access to relevant information, as this bank 
wants to promote its practices and consequently people were not at all reluctant, but 
were very willing, to show how they work.  
 
To avoid the bias that an individual researcher might bring to the study, we 
worked in a team in each step of the analysis. All researchers contributed to the 
definition of the key topics for the interviews. At least 2 members of the team were 
involved in each interview, if more than one interview had been arranged at the same 
time. As soon as possible the recordings were listened to, transcribed and then 
discussed by the team. Sometimes the researchers involved in the interviews 
provided the other members of the team with informal evidence and notes taken 
during the fieldwork. Differently, corporate meetings were attended by all the 
researchers. At the time, working notes were taken and, as soon as the meetings 
ended, they were converted into reports separately prepared by each member of the 
team.  
 
The researchers organized the transcripts chronologically and discussed the 
interviews, summarizing the data, where possible, around the conception of business 
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ethics provided in Section 2 and the relevant themes about ERM outlined in Section 
3. The issues that were impossible to summarize in such themes were discussed 
separately and associated with one or more issues of broader interest. 
 
5. CASE STUDY 
 
5.1 Setting the context  
Credit cooperative banks represent an integral and well-established part of the 
European financial system. Historically, the birth of credit cooperative banks in 
Europe was a response to the challenge of providing affordable loans to the emerging 
class of workers, shopkeepers and farmers with no or little collateral who had limited 
access to credit.  Due to the fact that credit obtained from money lenders was often 
available only at exorbitant interest rates, the central idea of a cooperative credit 
institution was simple: the people excluded from the financial system had to be self-
reliant. Credit was to be financed internally, i.e. by the group’s collective savings. If 
external funds were needed, they were to be borrowed on the group’s joint liability. 
However, the historical motivations related to the birth and the development of the 
credit cooperative banks still persist.  
 
Over the last years, academics and practitioners have paid increasing attention to 
the issues of credit cooperative banks, focussing on their features and peculiarities. 
Some authors define such banks as “ethical banks”, which aim to achieve both 
economic profitability and social profitability (San Jose et al, 2011: Barbu and 
Vintilã, 2007; Buttle, 2007; Thompson and Cowton, 2001). It has been argued (San 
Jose et al, 2011, Cowton 2010) that such banks, in achieving their economic and 
social purposes, builds their core business on the following three ethical principles, 
which represent the meeting point between traditional banking and business ethics 
(Viganò, 2001): Affinity, Responsibility and Integrity. The Affinity principle is based 
on investments that meet the interests of both shareholders and depositors and 
concerns the responsibility of the banks in decisions regarding the placement of the 
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assets as well as the final destination of deposited funds. The Responsibility principle 
is about being accountable for consequences of the bank’s behaviour for the local 
community as a whole. The Integrity principle, fostered by close proximity to 
customers, is related to the attempt to avoid financial exclusion, a phenomenon 
involving social categories such as immigrants, women, young and old people i.e. the 
so-called non-bankable people, to which credit is denied (Cowton, 2002). In this 
sense, the funding of groups not financed by the traditional banking system is a 
specific feature of the credit cooperative banks.  
The International Cooperative Alliance (2007) defines credit cooperative banks as 
“Autonomous associations of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social, cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise”. Such banks operate on the basis of their 
distinguishing features: economic and social purposes, mutuality, governance 
structure and democratic principle (Ayadi et al., 2010).  
 
The first peculiarity of the credit cooperative banks is related to their twofold 
purpose: economic profitability and social profitability. These banks, as financial 
intermediaries, have to meet the members’ needs to ensure economic profitability 
but, at the same time, they have the character of socially responsible entities with the 
aim of contributing to the development of communities and local areas. It means that 
economic profitability is one of the objectives of the bank, but it is not exclusive or 
even the primary objective. This position is described well in Christensen et al. 
(2004) and in Ayadi et al. (2010) as “dual bottom line” institutions indicating that 
cooperative banks need to generate profit in order to survive and expand, but that 
profit is not the sole or even primary bottom line objective. Likewise, Groeneveld 
and de Vries (2009) argued that “…cooperative banks claim that they do not aim to 
maximise short-term profits while healthy profitability is an important necessary 
condition for cooperative banks to safeguard their continuity, to finance growth and 
credit, and to provide a buffer for inclement times… profit is not a goal in itself”. 
Clearly, credit cooperative banks need to be assessed in terms of their economic 
performance, since economic performance determines their ability to survive as 
 Chapter 3 
 
 
87 
financial institutions over the longer term. However, economic or financial 
performance cannot be the only standard of assessment, since economic or financial 
success is not an end in itself for any organisation.  The financial objectives of 
organisations are merely the means for realising the ultimate objectives of people, 
and these are non-financial in nature (see Simon, 1952).  
Cooperative banks operate on the basis of the mutuality principle. The mutuality 
principle represents a different way to make profits. The mutuality principle states 
that organizations have to provide services to their members on more favorable 
terms, through the comparative advantage of establishing trust (Kay, 2006). The 
mutuality principle aims to provide benefits to member/shareholder related to their 
membership rather than to achieve economic benefits. The special value of mutuality 
rests on its capacity to establish and sustain long-term relationships. In particular, it 
should be reflected in the company’s constitution.  
Credit cooperative banks are effectively owned and controlled by their local 
customers through the membership concept. Cooperative banks are owned by their 
members, who are private citizens and individual entrepreneurs who have a stake in 
the bank. However, a cooperative bank may have customers who are not members. 
In general ownership stakes in cooperative banks are not transferable. Members 
cannot sell their ownership stakes in an open secondary market, although in some 
cases they can sell them back to the bank. Exit is however possible through the 
repayment of the members’ shares. Whilst there are exceptions, the almost exclusive 
source of capital for a cooperative bank is retained profits. These profits are retained 
within the bank and are added to reserves (capital) and dividends are generally not 
paid although members may sometimes be able to vote for a limited distribution of 
profits.  
In order to align the banks’ objectives with their members’ interests, their 
governance is built on the democratic principle. Accordingly, the voting rights of the 
user-members are allocated in accordance with the ‘one member, one vote’ principle 
rather than in proportion to the size of ownership stakes.   
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However, despite the several common key features of credit cooperative banks, 
there is no single universal model within individual countries or across countries that 
is common to every cooperative bank. This means that there is no completely 
homogeneous set of cooperative banks across Europe. Therefore, the European 
mutual cooperative banking sector can be characterised as Commonality with 
Diversity (Ayadi et al., 2010). The nature of a cooperative bank is often described by 
its internal statutes and by its laws or articles of association. National laws on 
cooperatives also exist, providing the general principles of operation and the 
protection of members and third parties (Ayadi et al., 2010).  
 
In Italy, there is not a specific law to determine the fundamental nature and 
general operational principles of cooperative banks, but they are regulated by a 
chapter of the broader national law on the banking sector (Testo Unico Bancario - 
TUB, 2007). The cooperative banking sector represents a growing proportion of 
banking activity in Italy and the trend is likely to continue in the years to come (Istat, 
2012). Although government support is available in some notable cases at the 
European level, Italian credit cooperative banks are private enterprises, i.e. 
organisations that use resources to add value in the creation of goods and services 
(Catturi, 2007) and are referred to as Banche di Credito Cooperativo (henceforth, 
BCC). 
 
BCCs play a very important role in the Italian banking sector through the 
widespread distribution in many cities (sometimes representing the only bank in a 
local community). They serve a large number of clients and have an increasing 
number of members/shareholders. In particular, BCCs maintain a significant 
presence in the less populated municipalities, i.e. those with less than 5,000 
inhabitants, which helps them to achieve greater proximity and provide better access 
in these areas.  
 
The following tables show the BCCs in numbers  (Caldarelli et al. 2012): 
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NUMBER OF 
BCCs 
AFFILI
ATES 
TOWNS WITH 
BCCs 
CLIENTS 
412 4,411 2,705 6,700,000 
 
Data in billion of euros  
  
DEPOSITS LOANS 
LOANS TO 
FIRMS 
REGULATORY 
CAPITAL  
152.2 139.9 93.4 19.7 
 
 
According to the mutuality principle, BCCs conduct their business primarily for 
its members/shareholders. More specifically, due to Italian law, BCCs must carry out 
at least the 50% of their banking activity for members/stakeholders (art. 35 T.U.B.). 
It is important to highlight that, in order to emphasize the strong relationship with the 
local region, all members of BCCs have to prove they are resident (the registered 
office or the continuous activity) in the local community. According to Italian law 
(art. 37 T.U.B.), BCCs have to allocate 70% of profits to their legal reserve, with 3% 
to the Mutual Fund and the distribution to members cannot be more than 2.5% above 
the interest free rate. The remainder is to be used for charitable purposes. 
 
BCCs operate within the “European Association of Cooperative Banks”, an 
European network of credit cooperative banks, that represents and defends, within 
the EU institutions, the interests and the needs of cooperatives and promotes 
cooperation through the coordination of different national authorities. The network 
exists at three levels: local, regional and national.  BCCs, at local level, are grouped 
into separate regional federations, which provide technical assistance and undertake 
internal auditing for their members. In Italy, the functions of these regional bodies 
are overseen by the national association, Federcasse, which is also in charge of the 
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BCCs’ strategic planning functions. Within this network, BCCs operate in a 
decentralised manner (Di Salvo, 2002). Most of the centralised functions are 
available on a voluntary basis, effectively maintaining the autonomy of the local 
banks. This high degree of autonomy enables them to better meet their local 
members’ needs. 
 
BCC di Napoli is a ‘young’ bank founded in 2007 and carries out its banking 
activities in Naples, in the South of Italy. As with all BCCs, BCC di Napoli aims to 
achieve economic profitability to guarantee its economic sustainability (Il Denaro, 
19 luglio 2012). On the other hand, its activities are also oriented to the achievement 
of social profitability, which means funding economic activities with social value for 
the local community (start-ups, renewable energy, plastic recycling and soon) and 
not funding investment in speculative projects or services which are regarded as 
"negative areas" (i.e. pollution, pornography, tax evasion, drugs, mafia, etc). The 
main goal of BCC di Napoli is to promote bottom-up development of the Neapolitan 
community through assisting young people not financed by traditional large banks, 
promoting sustainable growth of small-medium sized entities, as well as observing 
its duty of beneficence. As declared by the Chairman in the Annual Meeting for the 
approval of the Financial Statement 2010,  
 
Our activity refers to projects that, through their objectives (ecology, 
employment, renewable energy) or the people they target (those who cannot 
obtain a loan from the traditional bank) create only positive value for the 
social environment of our area (Chairman).  
 
According to the mutuality principle, BCC di Napoli conducts over 70% of its 
activity
5
 for its members/shareholder. At a deeper level, BCC di Napoli directs its 
activities toward internal mutuality, viewed as the creation of economic and social 
value for the client-member. At the same time, BCC di Napoli aims to pursue the 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted that BCC di Napoli conducts more of its activity for its members, than the 
minimum required by law, which is 50%of banking activity.  
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economic, social and environmental interests of the local community, i.e. external 
mutuality. Moreover, BCC di Napoli fulfils purposes related to systemic mutuality, 
with the other cooperative banks, to enhance cooperation and promote the 
development of the network.  
 
At this stage, it can be illustrated how the ethical nature of BCC di Napoli fits 
with some of the principles of business ethics outlined by Bowie. The following table 
shows how the driving values practically attained by BCC di Napoli relate to the 
theoretical conception of Business Ethics developed by Bowie, as explained in 
Section 2.  
 
 
Table 3: Principle of Business Ethics (Bowie, 1999) vs Driving Values of BCC di 
Napoli 
Principle of Business Ethics  
(Bowie, 1999) 
Driving values  
of  BCC di Napoli 
The business firm should consider 
the interests of all affected stakeholders 
in any decision it makes. 
Affinity Principle: BCC di Napoli’s 
investments meet the interests of both 
shareholders/members and clients. 
The firm should allow those affected 
by the firm’s rules and policies to 
participate in the determination of those 
rules and policies before they are 
implemented.  
 
It should not be the case that, for all 
decisions, the interests of one 
stakeholder automatically take priority.  
Democratic Principle  
The voting rights of the 
shareholders/members are allocated in 
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When a situation arises where it 
appears that the interest of one set of 
stakeholders must be subordinated to 
the interests of another set of 
stakeholders, that decision should not be 
made solely on the grounds that there 
are a greater number of stakeholders in 
one group than in another.  
accordance with the ‘one member, one vote’ 
system rather than in proportion to the size 
of ownership stakes. 
Responsibility principle:  
BCC di Napoli is accountable for 
consequences of their behaviour on the local 
community as a whole. 
No business rule or practice should 
be adopted which is inconsistent with 
the first two formulations of the 
categorical imperative.  
 
Every profit-making firm has a 
limited, but genuine, duty of 
beneficence. 
BCC di Napoli invests more than the 
minimum required by law in funding of 
activities with social, cultural and 
environmental advantages for the local 
community. 
Every business firm must establish 
procedures designed to ensure that 
relations among stakeholders are 
governed by rules of justice.  
Integrity Principle: BCC di Napoli 
attempts to prevent that there will be 
organisations, micro companies, black 
economy or groups excluded from the 
financing system. 
 
In practice, BCC di Napoli practically fulfils “the interests of all the affected 
stakeholders in any decision” principle of Bowie (1999), as it is similar to the 
Affinity Principle, which considers the members’ interests and the stakeholders’ 
needs in defining the placement of assets. Furthermore, in accordance with Bowie’s 
view - the interests of one (or one set of) stakeholder(s) should not take 
automatically priority, and that decisions should not be made solely on the grounds 
that there is, for example, a greater number of stakeholders in one group than in 
another – BCC di Napoli ensures that in decision making there is no prevailing 
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interest because of ownership stakes (i.e. Democratic Principle), and more broadly 
that the needs of the local community as a whole are considered (i.e. Responsibility 
Principle), and also that the bank is  accountable for the consequences of its 
behaviour to the local community. Finally, another interesting aspect of similarity is 
that according to the Integrity Principle BCC di Napoli, talking in Bowie’s terms, 
“seeks to ensure that relations among stakeholders are governed by rules of justice”. 
Indeed, one of the most important characteristics of such a cooperative bank is that it 
has a commitment to equal opportunities, by including such organisations as micro 
companies, groups otherwise excluded from the financial system or the black 
economy. Moreover, BCC di Napoli’s activities, in the words of Bowie (1999), result 
in “a limited but genuine duty of beneficence”, as it invests money in activities for 
the promotion of the health, environmental safeguards and protection of the artistic 
heritage. Although two of Bowie’s principles find no match in the table, it should be 
emphasized that, as highlighted by Bowie (1999), in BCC di Napoli  “no business 
rule or practice should be adopted, which is inconsistent with the first two 
formulations of the categorical imperative”. 
5.2 Mission and Objectives  
BCC di Napoli’s activity is strongly rooted in the Neapolitan region and, rather 
than maximising short-term economic value, it seeks to maximise from a broad 
perspective the interests of its members/shareholders, who typically maintain long-
term trusting relationships with the bank.  
BCC di Napoli’s Mission is clearly declared in its Statute:  
Carrying out its activities, BCC di Napoli is based on the principle of 
mutuality without speculative nature. Its purpose is to create favourable 
conditions for its members and the local community in the products and 
services provided by the bank, pursuing the improvement of the moral, 
cultural and economic conditions and promoting the development of 
cooperation as well as the social cohesion, the responsible growth and the 
sustainable development of the territory in which it operates. (art. 2, 
Statute). 
 Chapter 3 
 
 
94 
As confirmed in the interviews, the mission is shared and embedded within the 
organization as a whole. All the interviewees emphasized that they perceive BCC di 
Napoli as “our bank” with an “open door policy” or “familiar approach”. In this 
regard, The Chairman emphasized as follows: My personal commitment is to assure 
that people share a common vision of the role and the potential of our bank, not only 
for the needs of the mistreated territory of Naples, but also for the cooperative 
network as a whole. Communication makes people feel involved in the activities, 
part of a family with the same values. We just communicate, as soon as we can, 
everything that matters: communication is knowledge and knowledge is the oxygen 
for our activity”.  (Chairman). This is also confirmed by the interview with the Risk 
Controller, who said: “You really need to talk each other if you want to build a team 
rather that just the sum of individuals with their autonomous conflicting opinions”. 
(Risk Controller) 
 
When we were in the bank for the interviews, we realized that there were daily 
meetings between the members of each team and also of each member separately 
with the team leader to discuss problems, suggestions or strategies of action for any 
special cases. There were also informal meetings, as the employees frequently had 
lunch together and discussed specific problems of their activities during the day or 
recent news from newspaper articles that could have an impact on BCC di Napoli’s 
activity. 
 
Given the values which shapes the ethical nature of BCC di Napoli, which were 
already addressed above, what it is important to show here is that the strong 
commitment of top management to promote a corporate mission in day-to-day 
practices of the bank is positively perceived and welcomed by all the employees. In 
this way, such values represent an integral part of everyone’s work within BCC di 
Napoli. In this regard, one member of the Accounting Division said: 
 
We share values, we share goals, we act for our community and all these 
aspects of my work make me feel better at the end of the day. I feel lucky to 
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be an employee of this bank because this bank plays a relevant role for the 
Neapolitan community. (Member of the Accounting Division)  
However, the following quotes from the interview with the Chairman clarify the 
extent to which BCC di Napoli has to achieve its social purposes.  
 
Researchers: As Chairman, how do you see the Mission of BCC di 
Napoli? 
Chairman: The mission of BCC di Napoli is to achieve the common 
good of the local community.  
Researcher: Is BCC di Napoli a sort of charitable institution?  
Chairman: (….) Obviously no, it is not. BCC di Napoli is a bank and, as 
a bank, has to make profits in order to ensure its existence and durability. 
The mission is clearly translated into BCC di Napoli’s objectives, both economic 
and social. BCC di Napoli’s economic objectives are identified by the General 
Director and formalized in specific risk return indicators. The economic objectives, 
as defined by the General Director, are examined by the Chairman and the Board of 
Directors, and approved by them. The main economic objective is growth in the 
number of members/shareholders, in order to increase the amount of capital, as this is 
the only source of new money. The interview with the General Director and the 
analysis of the internal operational plan showed that in 2007 the bank had two targets 
related to the number of members/shareholders. The first was quite cautious (2900 
members for the end of 2010) than the other more optimistic (3400 members by the 
end of 2010). It is worth noting that BCC di Napoli is actually achieving its 
economic targets (Strategic Plan 2012). At the end of 2011, BCC di Napoli had 
increased its members, which were 3,164 with a total amount of € 7,326,500 of the 
share capital.  
On the other hand, BCC di Napoli’s social purposes are defined by its local 
community. It is important to highlight that all members of the Board of Directors 
drew attention to the role of local firms and people in defining the bank’s social 
purposes. They are actively involved in the objective setting process, as it represents 
a distinguishing feature of BCC di Napoli’s ‘modus operandi’ which relates to the 
 Chapter 3 
 
 
96 
ethical nature of its banking activity. In this regard, clarifying that BCC di Napoli 
does not have its own social purposes, one member of the Board said: 
 
In order to promote the economic and social development of the 
Neapolitan community, we do not have to identify social purposes of the 
bank, because BCC di Napoli does not have its own social purposes. Our 
role (the role of the bank) is just to help our members and local people to 
achieve what they want to achieve, if their projects are relevant for the 
growth of our territory. For this reason, in 2009 we realized that we had 
to actively involve our members, people and local firms in order to know 
more specifically which social benefits they are looking for. (Member of 
the Board of Directors) 
 
In order to meet the needs of the local community, an exercise was undertaken in 
which the Head of the Branch
6
 collected data from local people 
(members/shareholder and external clients) from the different Municipalities where 
BCC di Napoli operates, in order to find out what are their priorities in terms of 
social purposes. The following quote from the Head of the Branch of BCC di Napoli 
explains how local people are involved in the objective setting process: 
On the basis of our knowledge of the Neapolitan region and 
considering the instructions of the Board of Directors, the strategic 
planning function and I identified a list of 21 social needs of our 
community, grouped into 10 categories. To gather information from the 
shareholders/members, I prepared a questionnaire to be submitted by 
email to them. On the other hand, to collect data from the external 
people I interviewed 350 external clients with the help of two cashiers. 
We had a discussion with them, to understand what are the major 
problems in the Municipality in which they live and how, in their 
opinion, BCC di Napoli could support the local development. All the 
clients were very willing to spend half an hour of their time talking with 
                                                          
6
 This bank has just one branch, which is located in Naples.   
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us, and one of them said: “The Neapolitan community really needs this 
sort of banking activity and I want to promote you (the bank) and your 
activity within my family and my friends. This is the only way we have to 
fill our gap in terms of economic growth and local development” (Head 
of Branch).  
 
Once all information from the different respondents was gathered, the social needs 
were aggregated in order of priority. It is interesting to note that the opinions 
expressed by the interviewees are not related to their age and gender, but to the 
Municipality in which they live. The following lists shows the social purposes that 
BCC di Napoli aims to achieve, in order of priority of needs as expressed by the 
Neapolitan community (Strategic Plan, 2010):  
 
1. Local Firms (including start-ups) 
2. Artisans and Farmers 
3. Occupation 
4. Environment 
5. Combating Crime 
6. Health 
7. Education 
8. Immigrants 
9. Culture 
10. Sport 
 
The Board of Directors and the strategic planning function discussed the above 
classification of social needs, in order to define the right direction of BCC di 
Napoli’s activity. However, in this regard it is important to note the following quote 
from the interview with the Chairman: 
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We don’t want to identify different social needs or modify the priority 
as expressed by the Neapolitan community. Our role is just to ensure 
whether or not they are consistent with our risk appetite, in order to 
ensure that our bank is able to achieve them as well as to support the 
local community (Chairman). 
 
5.3 The operationalization of ERM 
The development of a risk appetite framework in BCC di Napoli, which dates 
back to 2009, shapes the on-going attitude to risks in areas that are central to its key 
strategy. This is confirmed by the interview with the Risk Controller, who said: “We 
define risk appetite as the amount and type of risk we are willing to accept in the 
pursuit of our objectives” (Risk Controller).  
 
It should be noted that BCC di Napoli, along with other traditional large banks, 
has to comply with the rules set out in the regulatory regime issued at European level 
(Basel II and Basel III, starting by 2013). This regulatory regime provides a set of 
metrics that enter de jure in the risk appetite statement, such as Tier 1 or Total 
Capital ratios. Nevertheless, the relevant regulatory discipline for risk appetite is 
Pillar 2 of the Basel 2 framework, made up by two components, Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP).  
 
In compliance with the regulatory framework, BCC di Napoli’s defines its Risk 
Appetite Framework, according to the following structured approach to: 
1) Define the risk capacity by identifying regulatory constraints that restrict its 
capacity to accept risk (Strategic Plan, 2011). BCC di Napoli’s regulatory constraints 
are classified as: 
 Financial – these tend to be quantitative in nature and therefore easier 
to interpret. (Capital ratios and liquidity metrics are examples of financial 
regulatory constraints).  
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 Other – these tend to be predominately qualitative in nature and 
therefore require judgment in interpreting requirements and assessing 
compliance. (Examples include maintaining compliance with legislative and 
regulatory requirements, and adhering to privacy and information security 
regulations).  
 
2) Establish and regularly confirm risk appetite, as defined by drivers and self-
imposed constraints to limit or otherwise influence the amount of risk undertaken. 
More in depth, drivers can be regarded as objectives that imply risks, which BCC di 
Napoli must accept to generate the desired financial return (Operational Plan, 2011). 
On the other hand, self-imposed constraints represent quantitative and qualitative 
statements that restrict the amount of risk BCC di Napoli is willing to accept. 
Examples of such self-imposed constraints are: ensure capital adequacy by 
maintaining capital ratios in excess of regulatory thresholds, maintain low exposure 
to market risk, ensure sound management of liquidity and funding risk, maintain a 
generally acceptable regulatory risk and compliance control environment, maintain a 
risk profile that is no riskier than that of the average peer. For each category of self-
imposed constraints BCC di Napoli has a set of quantitative and qualitative key 
measures, which are regularly reviewed and updated, and approved by the Risk 
committee and the Board of Directors. (Riskiness Measure Report, 2010)  
 
3) Translate risk appetite into risk limits and tolerances that guide BCC di Napoli 
in its risk taking activities (Riskiness Measure Report, 2010). Risk limits are 
quantifiable levels of maximum exposure BCC di Napoli will accept. They are 
established only for risks that are financial and measurable, such as credit risk and 
liquidity risk.  Risk tolerances are qualitative statements about BCC di Napoli’s 
willingness to accept risks that are not necessarily quantifiable and for those risks 
where BCC di Napoli does not have direct control over the risks it accepts (such as 
legal risk and reputational risk). The bank also communicates risk limits and 
tolerances through policies, operating procedures and limit structures. 
4) Regularly measure and evaluate the Bank’s risk profile against risk limits and 
tolerances, ensuring appropriate action is taken in advance of risk profile surpassing 
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risk appetite (Operational plan, 2011).  
However, as emphasized in an interview with the Risk Controller, BCC di Napoli 
has an implicit and not formalized risk appetite, embedded in its risk management 
culture as well as in its direct ethical commitment. In this regard, the Risk Controller 
said: 
 
Our risk culture is permeated by the direct commitment of all 
individuals to the social purposes that the Bank aims to achieve. We 
don't want to minimize all risks that BCC could take in the future, but we 
want to assume and manage as much as we can those risks that the bank 
must take in order to meet its members’ needs as well as to sustain the 
local growth. Therefore, the risk management process in BCC di Napoli 
can be regarded as a strategic priority shared by all employees. Also, a 
key element of the culture is the long term trust relationship with the 
employees, who share the ethical purposes of the bank. Therefore, our 
risk appetite is defined by a formal framework developed in our internal 
procedures, but also incorporates a "soft component", related to our 
internal environment. (Risk Controller)  
 
Once it has defined its risk appetite, BCC di Napoli identifies risks that may affect 
its banking activity. The interviews with the Risk Controller and the Board of 
Directors clarified that the risk identification aims to identify both the main and the 
emerging risks. In particular, the Risk Controller said:  
 
While some fear that the attempts to capture such risks, as 
ambiguously defined “emerging risks”, may trap banks in a long series 
of stress tests and scenario planning, we agree that a broader perspective 
on plausible risks, even if remote, could have a significant systemic 
impact would be highly beneficial. (Risk Controller) 
 
At the same time, risk identification in BCC di Napoli is an iterative process, 
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which requires both a bottom-up and top-down approach. On one hand, on the basis 
of the scenarios analysis the Risk Controller and the Board of Directors, who have a 
more comprehensive view of BCC di Napoli’s activities, specify a plausible range of 
risks that the bank has to take and, consequently, define the role and responsibilities 
for the management of each kind of risk. On the other hand, the risk identification 
process in BCC di Napoli also refers to the information provided by the Credit Risk 
Controller, the Compliance Officer, the Supervisory Committee, as well as the 
Money Laundering Committee. As emphasized by the Chairman: “Due to their 
previous experience, Executives could bring more to the discussions. They can make 
valuable observations particularly because they sit on other boards and can bring 
different perspectives”. (Chairman). What should be emphasized is that all the 
interviews confirmed that all employees involved in the risk identification process 
are encouraged to be ‘creative and communicative’. In this regard, we report a quote 
from the Risk Controller during one corporate meeting: 
There is no computer that can churn out a list of emerging risks. We 
are a few of people and we have a lot of ideas. So we are working on 
ways to get us to communicate concerns or ideas about the risks that 
may occur. All of you may have an idea that we haven’t thought about or 
each of us (Risk Controller and the Board of Directors) may focus on the 
wrong things or miss something small, and others can help highlight ‘the 
risk of today’s bright ideas’ (Risk Controller).  
The following table shows the main risks which affect BCC di Napoli’s activities 
and the organizational functions involved in the management of those risks. 
 
Table 4: Main risks and risk functions in BCC di Napoli  
 
WHAT WHO 
CREDIT RISK 
Credit Risk Monitoring Function LIQUIDITY RISK  
MARKET RISK  
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COMPLIANCE RISK Compliance Officer 
STRATEGIC RISK General Director & Strategic Planning Function 
CONCENTRATION RISK Concentration Risk Committee  
OPERATIONAL RISK Risk Controller 
CRIME RISKS  Prevention Of Crime Risks Committee 
 
However, with reference to the above categories of risk, a distinction should be 
highlighted. The management of some of the above risks is mandatory while the 
management of others is voluntary. According to the European and Italian law, BCC 
di Napoli identifies credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, compliance risk, strategic 
risk, concentration risk, strategic risk and operational risk. Each of these risks is 
measured, monitored and managed by a specific organizational function/committee 
of BCC di Napoli. What should be noted is that, although it is not prescribed by law, 
BCC di Napoli identifies, measures, monitors and manages a particular category of 
risks, i.e. the Crime risks, by appointing a specific committee. In general, this 
category of risks can encompasses a number of risks associated with crime; however, 
BCC di Napoli considers only money laundering risk, bribery risks and fraud risk 
management, as relevant for its banking activities.  The following table provides a 
picture of the different risks, classified in terms of their likelihood and impact, which 
BCC di Napoli has to manage due to its specific activity, as a basis for determining 
how to prioritize such risks.  
 
Table 5: Risks Map of Bcc di Napoli  
 
 IMPACT 
LIKELIH
OOD 
Incide
ntal 
Minor Moderat
e 
Major Extreme 
Frequent  
  Credit  
Risk 
Liquidity  
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Risk 
Likely  
Complia
nce  
Risk 
Reputati
onal  
Risk 
Concentrat
ion 
Risk 
 
Possible 
Marke
t  
Risk 
Crime 
 Risks 
 
Operation
al Risk 
 
Unlikely   
Strategic 
Risk 
  
Rare      
The credit risk and the liquidity risk are the most important risks that BCC di 
Napoli has to manage, because its activity consists of providing loans to both 
members/shareholders and external clients. However, it is also important to consider 
the concentration risk, due to the fact that BCC di Napoli carries out its activity only 
in the Neapolitan region. With reference to the operational risk, it is important to 
highlight that BCC di Napoli is a young bank, and consequently the definition of its 
procedural actions is still in progress. Furthermore, BCC di Napoli does not take 
specific account of market risk, as it explicitly avoids investment in speculative 
activities. What should be noted, however, is that BCC di Napoli is relatively safe 
from Crime Risks, as its internal procedures define a complex set of controls to avoid 
crimes occurring.  
 
 
5.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Enterprise Risk Management in BCC di 
Napoli 
The Risk Controller is the coordinator of the Enterprise Risk Management process 
and he controls the activities involved in the risk management process and ensures 
that the internal procedures are observed by all the different functions.  
 
The Risk Management team in BCC di Napoli receives monthly a complex set of 
risk indicators from each of the different organizational functions involved in the 
management of the specific risks. Once the different reports are collected, the Risk 
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Management Team aggregate the data into a dashboard, in order to generate a 
complete view of the overall risk exposure. The Risk Controller reports monthly 
(until last year every three months) to the Board of Directors the overall risk exposure 
aggregated in the dashboard, emphasizing the key risk indicators for each category of 
risk. However, as emphasized during the interviews with the Risk Controller and the 
member of the Board of Directors, the dashboard is only regarded as diagnostic 
control tool, in order to periodically scan for anything unusual that might indicate a 
potential problem. In this regard, one member of the Board cryptically stated: 
 
We have the detailed and updated internal procedures, we refer to 
sophisticated risk measures to define different ratios and indexes. 
According to the law, we organized different risk information in 
different reports and those reports should be accurately read. However, 
they can help us to make our choices, to select the investment projects, 
to define the strategy, but they cannot reflect the real risk exposure of 
BCC di Napoli. This is for sure (Member of the Board of Director). 
 
However, the risk management process in BCC di Napoli is not only related to the 
introduction of different quantitative tools and measurement techniques (as required 
by law) to calculate and minimize those risks that can be measured in numbers – i.e. 
risks which can be regarded as ‘hard risk’. As emphasized by the Risk Controller,  
 
We calculate ‘hard risk’ ex ante and we consequently allocate the 
regulatory capital. We feel that the measurement of risks, despite regular 
and detailed, cannot reflect the risk exposure of the Bank as a whole. 
(Risk Controller) 
 
As clarified by the interviews with a member of the risk management team, the 
ERM process in BCC di Napoli benefits from the active participation of all people 
involved in the risk management activities at different levels of the organizations. 
Indeed, it should be noted that such people are actively involved in risk management 
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processes and not only merely compliant with the procedures. Instead, they point out 
any situations not covered by the procedures and emphasize when anomalies occur. 
In this regard, he noted: “Actually, this sort of activity goes beyond my work but it is 
related to my personal commitment for my work, for my bank and for my territory” (a 
member of the Risk Management team).  On the other hand, the personal 
commitment of each employee is crucial because it is on the basis of the alerts 
provided by the different functions that the Risk Controller tries to define how the 
Bank should operate in specific circumstances.  
 
Also, the enterprise risk management process is mainly informed by the personal 
background of the people involved in the process, especially in the evaluation of 
qualitative information which cannot be reduced to numbers; this is called ‘soft 
information’ in BCC di Napoli. In this regard, the Risk Controller emphasized:  
 
We have formal meetings every three months in order to evaluate 
those risks that are not measurable and not quantifiable, but we also have 
frequent informal discussions about what is happening and how the 
external events can have an impact on our performance. Recently, we 
realized that our risk management could make the bank relatively safe 
from negative events. However, we cannot predict the future or 
anticipate catastrophic circumstances. But… who is able to do this? This 
is what helps us (the bank) to reduce surprises along the way and to 
achieve its economic purposes and social purposes (Risk Controller). 
 
What should be noted is that the Risk Controller recognised that the active 
involvement of all the employees, their personal previous experiences and their 
direct commitment to the purposes that BCC di Napoli’s aims are the most important 
tools for managing operational risk: 
 
 Chapter 3 
 
 
106 
My experience suggests that operational risk, in most of the cases, is 
related to the humans’ behaviour and their ability to learn from previous 
mistakes. In my opinion, these are the most important ‘indicators’ which 
are able to ensure an on-going risk management process and its 
effectiveness (Risk Controller).    
 
5.5 The Credit Risk Management in BCC di Napoli  
The most important risk for BCC di Napoli is credit risk. The Credit Risk Officers 
calculate quantitative risk indicators for each of major lending area and aggregate 
them into an overall risk of the credit portfolio and draft a detailed report, which is 
submitted to the Chief Credit Officer. It should be noted that, during the interviews, 
the Chief Credit Officer emphasized that, despite the role of regulation in defining 
the risk management practices and procedures that BCC di Napoli is required to 
comply with,  
 
(….) the difference between BCC di Napoli and the other traditional 
large banks is that the management of the credit risk goes beyond how to 
secure our (the bank’s) money, but aims to evaluate whether or not we 
are going to provide funding with a social value for our territory. To this 
end, the credit risk management process in BCC di Napoli has some 
particularities related to the purposes we want to achieve (Chief Credit 
Officer).  
 
These peculiarities concern the credit risk assessment process. One peculiarity is 
related to the fact that BCC di Napoli screens both financial and non-financial 
aspects of investment projects. The first step in the risk assessment process aims to 
verify if the project is consistent with the bank’s risk appetite as well as to evaluate 
its economic profitability in terms of risk-return ratios. To this end, an important role 
is played by the personal and financial guarantees that the client is able to provide 
(Internal Procedure on Lending Process, 2010). However, to assess the risk of each 
loan, BCC di Napoli also considers a greater amount of information, and this 
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provides a broader picture of the investment project, with a specific focus on its 
benefits and advantages for the local community. This information includes the 
reputation and the integrity of the entrepreneur and the trust relationship with the 
bank, as well as the evaluation of environmental, occupational and cultural benefits 
of the project for the Neapolitan region. It should be noted the both the Risk Manager 
and the Credit Risk Controller gave great importance to the role of qualitative 
information in assessing the risk of each loan. Indeed, the Risk Controller 
emphasized the particular role of such information, which in the view of BCC di 
Napoli, can be regarded as a sort of ‘additional guarantee’. More specifically, the 
Credit Risk Controller said:   
 
The information related to the entrepreneur (including its legal position 
and moral conduct as well as the purposes that he aims to achieve with its 
economic activities) is crucial for us. Of course, we need a financial 
guarantee to ensure that the client will give the money back. But the 
additional information represents an important sort of guarantee for us, i.e. 
the guarantee that we will put money in a project that can bring benefit for 
the local community. We regard at this information as ‘additional’ because, 
usually, the other large banks do not care so much about that….. I mean…. 
We require more information that our client would not need to provide to 
other banks to receive the money. So this information is ‘additional’ for us, 
but it is not ‘secondary’ or ‘minor in importance’ for sure. It is the core of 
our business activity. (Credit Risk Controller) 
 
In this regard, it should be noted that, due to the fact that BCC di Napoli’s activity 
is based on a long-term trust relationships between itself and clients, they benefit 
from a high level of information.  
 
As there are no standard procedures, the Chairman and the Board of Directors in 
collaboration with the Risk Controller, carry out an evaluation of the information 
related to the ‘additional guarantees’. Due to the fact that the Chairman and the 
Board of Directors are responsible for the achievement of the BCC di Napoli’s 
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social purposes, they are actively involved in the evaluation of investment projects 
to ensure that the bank puts money into projects that have social value for the local 
community. However, in order to be aware of risks that could not be quantified in 
numbers, they rely on the experience-based judgment of the Risk Controller, who is 
also involved in the selection of the investment projects. Also, BCC di Napoli 
benefits from the knowledge and experience of the people involved in the 
management of risk at different level, because they can contribute to the strategic 
choices of BCC di Napoli.  In this regard, a member of the Board of Director 
provided an example:  
 
Last year, we had to decide whether give money or not to a firm 
which operates in a plastic recycling business. This is a particular 
business in our region, often influenced by criminal organizations (i.e. 
Camorra). Actually, our concern was also about the identity of the 
Entrepreneur, which called to my mind some criminal organizations of 
the Neapolitan area. However, this project was really relevant for the 
environment and profitable from the economic perspective. We decided 
to arrange an ad hoc meeting with the Chairman, the Board, the General 
Director, the Prevention of Crime Risks Committee, the Risk Controller 
and the Chief Credit Officer to evaluate this project. One member of the 
Prevention of Crime Risks Committee provided more personal 
information about the Entrepreneur because he had a personal 
relationship with him and gave more details about his moral conduct and 
responsiveness in doing business, also referring to some public 
information that we really ignored. For this reason, we decided to give a 
chance to this Entrepreneur, asking for different documents in order to 
evaluate the firm and its legal position. Then we decided to put money 
into this investment project. At the end of the year, this firm was 
proclaimed by the Italian Environmental Association as a benchmark for 
the firms which operate in plastic recycling business (Member of the 
Board of Director).  
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However, it should be noted that the Board of Directors is involved in the 
evaluation of every project, even the small loans. Although the internal procedure on 
lending process (2010) states that “the Board of Directors authorizes the Head of the 
Branch to grant loan up to the amount of 2,000 euros, after the proper evaluation of 
the Credit Risk Controller”, the Credit Risk Controller clarified that, apart from the 
formal administrative procedure, the lending process for small loans is exactly the 
same in practice, in terms of the evaluation of both financial and social aspects as 
well as the additional information required. Also, although the members of the 
Board are not required to check the box for the grant of the loan, the Credit Risk 
Controller usually discusses with the Chairman or another member of the Board 
about the evaluation of the small loans. In this regard, he clarified as follows:  
 
We are aware of the historical and rooted problems of crime that have 
plagued our beautiful city for a long time and we still have this sort of 
problems embedded in our territory. Unfortunately, this is one of the most 
important threats for our activity and the unique way to be involved is 
being transparent with clients, members and above all for all the aspects of 
our internal processes (Credit Risk Controller). 
 
The interview with the Head of the Branch confirmed that the activities related to 
the funding of small loans are not carried out only at the lower level of the bank and 
provided an example: 
 
In 2009, we received in two days four requests for funding (from 
1,500 euros to 2,000 euros) from four young local firms, who carry out 
their activity in the same Municipality of the Neapolitan region. Two of 
them were involved in the plastic recycle business and the other two 
firms were operating in the clothing industry. Such firms provide 
patrimonial collateral, but they were not willing to give detailed 
information about the destination of the money and were very vague 
about that. I personally had a chat with all of them in order to understand 
their purposes, why they are asking for money…. But they did not 
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convince me at all and I decided to not finance them. However, I had a 
discussion with one member of the Board of Directors and, as I 
presumed, he agreed with me. Two weeks later, the newspaper showed a 
number of criminal actions related to specific criminal organizations. 
Does this suggest something? (…….) We will be never able to know it 
but…… I’m very happy with how our bank is taking action.  (Head of 
the Branch) 
 
Another peculiarity of the ERM process in BCC di Napoli concerns the credit 
monitoring process. BCC di Napoli monitors the destination of the funding once a 
loan is granted, in order to ensure that the money is actually invested in projects with 
social purposes. The Chairman explained that, in order to monitor the destination of 
the funding provided by BCC, “the bank not only provides finance, but is actively 
involved in project design as well as in the implementation of the projects which the 
community needs to grow. Additionally, each member of the Board of Director 
emphasized that BCC di Napoli is willing to accept delays in payments due to 
temporary difficulties for its clients, if the project is relevant for the sustainable 
development of the community. This was confirmed by one of the BCC di Napoli 
clients who said that BCC did not modify the interest rate for the loan granted.  
 
It is important to highlight that, in order to promote the local growth, BCC di 
Napoli has recently issued € 2,000,000 of three year bonds which can only be 
purchased by people from Naples. These bonds are to be used only within the 
Neapolitan community, and they are particularly intended for funding small 
businesses, artisans and start-ups in the Neapolitan area. We will be more 
accountable and we will provide the community with information on our website 
about the customers we’ll give the money to. They will be “clean” businesses, young 
people who have business ideas but, unfortunately, find the doors of finance closed. 
(Chairman). Also, BCC di Napoli devotes a portion of its earnings to charity 
purposes that are not strictly related to the banking activity that BCC di Napoli 
carries out: e.g. health, education, environmental protection, employment and 
‘reduction of the black economy’. In this regard it should be noted that although 
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BCC di Napoli is required by law to comply with this sort of “duty of benefice”, the 
bank does not just spend the minimum for charity purposes. The goal is to trigger a 
virtuous circle whereby the citizens of Naples invest in BCC di Napoli, which then 
finances local companies, and the benefits come back to the city in the form of local 
development and jobs. 
 
5.6 The Role of the BCC’s Network 
The Enterprise Risk Management system in BCC di Napoli benefits from the 
control activities of the Internal Audit function as well as from the supervision of the 
External Audit for credit cooperative banks. What should be noted is that such 
activities are carried out at Network level, with the aim to ensure that all the 
cooperative banks operate in line with the ethical principle of the Network, to achieve 
both economic and social purposes.  
 
The Internal Audit function of all the banks (including BCC di Napoli) within the 
network of cooperative banks is outsourced at the regional level. However, 
Federcasse has prepared a contract that draws the attention of BCCs on the need to 
"customize" - the procedures, times and types of controls - the contract on the basis 
of their characteristics business.  
 
More in depth, the internal audit function evaluates the Enterprise Risk 
Management system of BCC di Napoli through both external controls and such 
activities in loco.  The former consists of processing the data derived from the 
quarterly supervisory reports on risk management; analysing the relation between the 
general risk that the BCC will take and the effects on the system of Cooperative 
Credit banks; identifying the methodologies used, the operating media or the 
organizational solutions aimed at ensuring an adequate risk management. 
 
The latter is related to the assistance to the management and the Board of the 
bank, in relation to the different demands for risk management, in particular in 
drafting the internal rules and procedures. In particular, as a result of meetings in 
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loco and accurate analysis of the financial statement and the internal documents 
(Rules, Regulation process, implementing provisions, procedures, reports, orders of 
service), the internal audit function defines a process of preliminary audit for BCC di 
Napoli. Then, the Internal Audit activities analyse the different risks identified by the 
management, focussing on the different tools and techniques for controlling and 
managing the ‘hard risks’, thus quantifying the score for the residual risk. After a 
discussion with Board of Directors and the risk controller, the preparation of a master 
plan follows, indicating the priorities for action. The following quote from the Risk 
Controller provide an overall picture of the role of the Internal Audit function in 
BCC di Napoli, and also considering the broader perspective its role within the 
Network of Cooperative banks. 
 
The Internal Audit activities are not properly outsourced, as they are 
carried out outside the bank but inside the network of cooperative banks, on 
the basis of specific standards for such banks. However, although the 
specific standards are specific for cooperative banks as they take into 
account the social purposes that all BCCs (and BCC di Napoli) aim to 
achieve, last year they obtained the certification of the alignment to the 
audit international standards for professional practice. (Risk Controller) 
Hence, what arises is that, thanks to the Network of cooperative banks, BCC di 
Napoli combines the economic constraints and social purposes of such banks, as 
characterized by a flexible organizational structure with features of traditional large 
banks. Hence, on the one hand the Internal Audit represents a “mentor” for BCC di 
Napoli, helping to orient the ERM process to achieve economic and social purposes. 
On the other hand, it provides an additional element of transparency for its clients, as 
it is compliant with the main international standards.  
In addition, with the aim of providing assurance on the effectiveness of the ERM 
system, BCC has opted for a voluntary external audit provided by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers (and Deloitte starting with the financial statement of 2012). This represents 
a further attempt to be transparent and accountable to the local community in order 
to attract new members/shareholders to the BCC di Napoli’s network with the aim of 
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legitimating its activities and increasing its reputation within the Neapolitan 
community.  
It should be noted that BCC di Napoli also benefits from the external audits 
specifically for credit cooperative banks provided by Federcasse, the Italian 
federation for credit cooperative banks. This audit activity is a different form of 
control, which aims to ensure that there is no speculation and that the banking activity 
in carried out in the light of the mutuality principle. With particular reference to the 
ERM system, the external audit aims at providing assurance on the effective role 
played by the ERM in achieving the ethical purposes.  
 
6. DISCUSSIONS 
This section aims to discuss the relationship between business ethics and 
Enterprise Risk Management. To this end, we are going to answer the key research 
questions on the basis of the analysis carried out in the case study section, trying to 
combine the conception of business ethics developed in the Section 2 and the issues 
addressed by the existing literature on ERM explained in the Section 3.   
 
The existing literature (e.g. Arena et al., 2010) has shown that ERM is not a 
standardized process, rather it represents a “context specific” system, which differs 
from firm to firm and needs to be embedded in organizational values, structure and 
purposes. Accordingly, the first research question pertains the way in which mutual 
credit cooperative banks operationalize ERM. The case study elucidates that the 
Enterprise Risk Management system of BCC di Napoli consists of a twofold order of 
activities. On the one hand, the risk management activities refer to a specific set of 
metrics that enter de jure in the risk management system of all banks (i.e. Tier 1, 
Total Capital ratios, Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment process – ICAAP- and 
the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process) according to the regulatory regime 
issued at European level (i.e. Basel II and Basel III starting by 2013). Hence, BCCs, 
along with other traditional large banks, manage their risk through a systematic 
process aimed at defining the objectives according to their risk appetite, identifying 
risks, monitoring and controlling all the risks that can have an impact on their 
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banking activities, using different risk measures and indexes. On the other hand, the 
case study shows that the operalization of ERM process is built on the ethical nature 
of the organization that is fully shared by its employees. Indeed, the ERM process 
encompasses a different order of activities based mainly on human behaviour as, for 
example, the collection and the analysis of ‘soft’ information about the values of 
clients and the purposes of each investment projects. In addition there are formal and 
informal discussions between the employees about all the risks that may occur as 
well as the trust relationship between the bank, the members/shareholder and the 
external clients. This practically means that all the people feel actively involved in 
the risk management process of the bank, considering it as a strategic priority not 
only for the bank, but also for themselves and the community in which they live. 
What is important to highlight is that these activities are not prescribed by law and 
they go beyond what is required by the internal procedures about the management of 
risks. Such activities are exclusively related to the internal environment, which is 
permeated by the ethical commitment of all individuals to the social purposes that the 
bank aims to achieve.  
 
Considering the operationalization of the holistic system for managing risks in 
BCC di Napoli enables us to answer the second research question about how the 
governance structure of credit cooperative banks shapes ERM. Many researchers 
(Paape and Speklè 2012; Demidenko and Mc Nutt, 2010; Beasley et al., 2008; Nocco 
and Stulz, 2006; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Lam 2011), semi-regutalory bodies 
(Casualty Actuarial Society Committee on Enterprise Risk Management 2003; 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2004) and 
professional associations (Institute of Internal Auditors, The Global Association of 
Risk Professionals, the Institute of Risk Management, European Commission) have 
examined the ERM from the governance perspective. Most (Beasley et al., 2008; 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2004; 
Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Lam 2011), in studying the effectiveness of the risk 
management system, have suggested the introduction of standardised governance 
models and the appointment of specific members of the senior management team, in 
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order to embed risk strategy throughout the enterprise, as well as to oversee the 
Enterprise Risk Management process.  
 
It is well known that credit cooperative banks have a lean governance structure, 
with restricted levels of employees, for reasons of costs minimization. Such banks do 
not have strong support at the senior management level and do not appoint specific 
members (i.e. Chief Risk Officer or Chief Financial Officer) to be responsible for 
managing their risks, as suggested by recent literature and the semi-regulatory 
bodies. However, what should be noted is that credit cooperative banks are able to 
pursue the effectiveness of the ERM process via the active participation of all people 
involved in risk management activities at the different levels of the organization. 
Indeed, the Board of Directors is responsible for the definition of both the economic 
and social objectives of the bank, but it is also actively involved in the evaluation of 
the investment projects, including small loans. On the other hand, at the executive 
level, the employees involved in the management of risks provide information and 
measures about the risks of their function, and also about activities that go beyond 
their own work. Indeed, because of the importance of their experience in the risk 
management area, their personal commitment to the purposes of the bank, their 
knowledge about the local territory and, sometimes, their personal relationships with 
the clients, they are encouraged to participate in risk identification, as well as the 
different phases of the risk management process. The Risk Controller coordinates the 
process by ensuring information flows between Board of Directors and the executive 
level both bottom up and top down, and more generally acts as a trait d’union, as he 
monitors all the information that is diffused and shared between the different 
functions for managing risks. However, the Risk Controller is not only responsible 
for the overview of the ERM process but he is actively involved the process, as he 
also helps the Board of Directors in the selection of investment projects. Hence, the 
governance structure of the credit cooperative banks, which relies on the direct 
ethical commitment of all members of the organizations, shapes the ERM practices 
in terms of roles and responsibilities, which are less structured, less formalized but, 
as they are allocated either implicitly or explicitly between all people involved in the 
management of risks, much more embedded within the bank itself. Moreover, the 
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fact that all people within the organization share the purposes of the bank represents 
an additional key element in supporting and sustaining the effectiveness of the 
management of risk process.  
 
At this stage, there is a need to clarify how ERM allows credit cooperative banks 
to pursue their economic, social purposes and ethical purposes, by answering the 
third research question. Because of the distinguishing features of cooperative banks, 
and thanks to the active role played by the Network of BCCs in supporting the 
achievement of their purposes, the ERM is fully embedded and integrated throughout 
such banks. In this way, such banks are able to achieve their economic, social and 
ethical purposes. Indeed, with reference the economic purposes, the ERM is helpful 
to cooperative banks in defining objectives that are consistent with banks’ risk 
appetite, using not only financial measures and sophisticated techniques, but also 
considering important information, regarded as ‘soft’ information, that is relevant to 
the definition of a broad picture of all the projects that the banks are prepared to 
fund. With reference to the social purposes, ERM process pays more attention to the 
evaluation of the effects of the banking activity and the benefit for the local 
community. To this end, an important role is played by the personal commitment of 
the people involved in the management of risk. With reference to the ethical 
purposes, it is to note that, despite mutual credit cooperative banks having to devote 
a portion of their profit to charitable purposes, the ERM is helpful in ensuring that 
such banks are able to invest in charitable activities more than the minimum required 
by law. Indeed, the system for managing risk is not intended to be as a mere tool of 
compliance. It is oriented to help the bank to ensure the development of the local 
community 
 
What should be noted is that the ERM is able to help credit cooperative banks to 
achieve their economic, social and ethical purposes because it is mainly informed by, 
and built on, the principles of business ethics suggested by the framework developed 
by Bowie.  
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The following table shows how the ERM is shaped by the principles of Business 
Ethics (as defined by Bowie, 1999):  
 
Table 6: Principles of Business Ethics (Bowie, 1999) and Enterprise Risk 
Management 
Principles of Business Ethics  
(Bowie, 1999) 
Enteprise Risk Management 
The business firm should consider 
the interests of all affected stakeholders 
in any decision it makes. 
The ERM process in credit cooperative 
banks considers the interests of all 
stakeholders starting with the objective 
setting process, with particular reference to 
the social purposes that the banks aim to 
achieve, as they are defined from their 
(external and internal) clients.  
The firm should allow those affected 
by the firm’s rules and policies to 
participate in the determination of those 
rules and policies before they are 
implemented.  
The ERM process in credit cooperative 
banks relies on the active participation of the 
employee in defining practice and rules from 
time to time before they are implemented.  
It should not be the case that, for all 
decisions, the interests of one 
stakeholder automatically take priority.  
The ERM process attempts to manage 
risks considering the interests of all 
stakeholders, without giving automatic 
priority to the interests of one (or a group) of 
them, as the ERM helps such banks to 
achieve the growth of the local community 
as a whole.  
When a situation arises where it 
appears that the interest of one set of 
stakeholders must be subordinated to 
the interests of another set of 
stakeholders, that decision should not be 
made solely on the grounds that there 
are a greater number of stakeholders in 
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one group than in another.  
No business rule or practice should 
be adopted which is inconsistent with 
the first two formulations of the 
categorical imperative.  
The ERM process helps credit 
cooperative banks to manage their risks 
considering the humanity and its economic 
and social development as an end, rather 
than a mere means to achieve their 
economic purposes.  
Every profit-making firm has a 
limited, but genuine, duty of 
beneficence. 
The ERM process enables credit 
cooperative banks to pursue their ethical 
purposes, also observing their (limited) duty 
of beneficence. 
Every business firm must establish 
procedures designed to ensure that 
relations among stakeholders are 
governed by rules of justice.  
The ERM process in credit cooperative 
banks is designed to (attempt to) give money 
to people which credit is denied, due to their 
lack of financial guarantees, by avoiding 
that there will be people excluded from the 
financial system.  
 
 
The above table shows how, using the framework developed by Bowie, it is 
possible to apply the Kantian ethics to business activity, with particular reference to 
the ERM process. Many academics and practitioners are quite skeptical about the 
introduction of business ethics into banking activity and, in particular, about its role 
in enterprise risk management system. Some of them regard business ethics as a 
more abstract, theoretical and subjective issue that does not meet the needs and the 
purposes of economic activity. However, the purpose of this study is not to provide a 
philosophical underpinning for the management of risks, but to deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between Business Ethics and Enterprise Risk 
Management in practices. Indeed, as was underlined in the introduction, it is still 
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unclear if the Enterprise Risk Management supports credit cooperative banks in 
pursuing their ethical purposes or Business Ethics supports Enterprise Risk 
Management system. As a result of our analysis of BCC di Napoli, we can argue that 
Business Ethics and Enterprise Risk Management are closely interrelated in the 
specific context of credit cooperative banks. In this sense, the interrelation can be 
illustrated as a circle: the ERM helps credit cooperative banks to achieve their 
economic, social and ethical purposes but, at the same time, in such banks the ERM 
is mainly built on the ethics shared and diffused within such organizations.  
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This research aims to understand how ERM works in action in credit cooperative 
banks, which have a twofold purpose: economic profitability and social development 
of local territory. In other words, the aim of this research is to clarify how ERM can 
help such banks to achieve their economic, social and ethical purposes. To this end, 
we referred to mutual credit cooperative banks since they have been defined in recent 
literature as “ethical banks” (San Jose et al., 2011) and due to the fact that they have 
been regarded as especially conducive to ethical and responsible business conduct 
(European Commission, 2011).  
 
This study contributes to the literature in different ways. On the one hand, the 
study contributes to the literature on ERM, filling the gap related to the lack of 
description about the relationship between business ethics and ERM in practices. In 
this regard, through an in-depth description of a specific credit cooperative bank, the 
study clarifies how the Enterprise Risk Management system is practically shaped by 
business ethics.  On the other hand, this study contributes to the literature on ethical 
banks by providing an in-depth description of how such banks practically manage 
their risks in a holistic way and in explaining role of ERM in achieving their 
purposes, with particular reference to issues of financial exclusion.  
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Moreover, in showing how the Enterprise Risk Management system helps credit 
cooperative banks to achieve their economic and social purposes, this research has 
some important implications in practice for similar banks in many countries which 
want to promote the economic growth of local communities. Indeed, the study sheds 
light on different aspects of ERM practices in each step of the holistic process for 
managing risks, often they are not related to the formal procedures of the banks, but 
embedded in the ethical nature of the organization.  
 
At this stage several questions still need to be considered. This paper focuses on 
credit cooperative banks as ethical banks. However, an interesting future 
development for this research could be to explore how enterprise risk management 
can lead other kind of banks (not specifically ethical banks) to achieve their social 
purposes. An additional question that remains to be considered is about the extent to 
which enterprise risk management practices can be ethically oriented and the extent 
to which they must fulfil certain economic constraints. Also, since the recent 
literature has emphasized the lack of research on issues related to micro companies, 
the black economy and groups excluded from the traditional financing system, either 
because of poverty or because they belong to certain social or ethnic groups, an 
interesting further development for this research could be related to the area of 
microfinance. 
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This thesis focuses on the issues related to the reporting and the management of risk 
in the banking sector, with specific reference to the Italian context. The thesis is 
oriented towards a deeper understanding on these issues, with especial attention to 
the importance of “to be compliant” with current regulation. In particular, the issues 
outlined above are addressed through the adoption of multiple theoretical and 
methodological perspectives, in order to progressively engage with the field of interest.  
The motivation behind this study lays primarily in the awareness that banks are 
risk management entities. It is well argued that risk disclosure is raised to a 
particular level of importance within banking organizations in comparison with 
non-financial firms because banks are inherently more opaque (Huang, 2006). Yet, 
due to the complexity of financial environments and the increasing diversity in the 
information needs, banks should comply also with the supervisory regulation from 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, which seeks to foster a secure and 
reliable financial sector (Oliveira et. al., 2011).  Therefore, banking companies can 
be expected to divulge significantly different types of risk disclosure (Bessis, 
2002). However, as relevant literature has extensively shown over the years, recent 
financial crisis revealed the failure in banking risk reporting and risk management 
practices. More in depth, it has been argued that shortcoming in accounting 
interacted with failures in governance and risk management practices (Magnan M. 
and Markarian G., 2011). Indeed, in many cases, risk management systems failed 
because of failure in governance, as information about exposure and strategies did 
not reach senior management (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  For this reason, this study is 
motivated also by the need for further investigation pertaining the implementation of 
the holistic risk management system, with especial regard to how they can be effective.  
On this basis, and taking into account the characteristic features of the Italian 
banking sector (Bischof, 2009), the thesis examined from different perspectives how 
financial companies disclose and manage their risks, by also highlighting the need to 
move from the mere compliance perspective to an ethical-oriented dimension.  
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Consequently, and in light of the specificities of the institutional environment, 
the thesis was divided in three chapters, based on different theoretical frameworks 
and methodologies, to address the above-cited issues. 
The first chapter examined the different risk disclosure requirements, issued by 
different regulators, in order to understand in detail which risk information should be 
reported by Italian banks in the three different reports identified by different regulators 
(Notes to the Financial Statement, Management Commentary, and Public Report). 
The research complements prior studies by focusing on an under-researched setting, 
such as the banking sector. Also, it study represents a valid contribution in that it 
provides a systematic overview of the current regulatory requirements for risk 
disclosure and discuss, from a theoretical perspective, whether the increasing in risk 
disclosure standard and authoritative disclosure recommendations are able to 
enhance the usefulness of banking risk disclosure by Italian banks. 
The second chapter, moving from the limitations of the first step of the research, 
also encompassed the empirical perspective, to deepen the issues relating to how risk 
information is provided by Italian banks, focusing on the characteristics of the 
information to assess the overall quality of disclosure, to find any differences 
between the Notes to Financial Statements and the Public Report, both prepared in 
compliance with the instructions of the Bank of Italy. Such an approach allowed to 
find out why risk disclosure by Italian banks looks less useful than it ought to be. 
Also, focusing on the Italian banks, the study will allow us to take into account the 
issues relating to risk disclosure in a context characterized by increasing regulation, 
strong legal enforcement and, therefore, the expectation for more useful information. 
In addition, the results of the analysis allow a more comprehensive analysis of the 
issues relating to risk disclosure, highlighting existing strengths and limitations, as 
well as the need for a systematic framework, shared at the European level, to ensure 
the usefulness of information. In the end, the results will be of interest also for policy 
makes, standard setters and supervisory bodies, as the research will shed light on 
some overlaps of the two competing regulations, with particular regards to the high 
degree of discretion that regulators allow to insiders. 
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Afterwards, to broaden the sphere of attention encompassing the problems 
relating to the “management” of risk information from the managers, the third 
chapter shifted the focus from the external viewpoint, pertaining the risk disclosure 
public available, to the internal perspective, relating to implementation of holistic 
systems for managing risks, that is Enterprise Risk Management (Mikes, 2011; 2009; 
Arena et al., 2010; Gephart et al., 2009; Power, 2009, COSO Report, 2004).  
Also, because of the increasing demand for integrating ethical values in “doing 
business” (Barbu and Vintilà, 2007; de Graaf, 2006), this chapter referred to credit 
cooperative banks, which are a particularly suitable basis for studying the 
relationship between business ethics and ERM due to the fact that they are especially 
conducive to ethical and responsible business conduct for the society (European 
Commission, 2011). The study is carried out by employing a single case study and 
framed by the redefinition of Kant’s moral philosophy provided by Bowie (1999), 
which explains how to apply the Kantian ethics to businesses.   
The findings elucidate how ERM can help such banks to achieve both their 
economic and ethical purposes. In this way, the study contributes to the literature on 
ERM, filling the gap related to the lack of description about the relationship between 
business ethics and ERM in practices. In this regard, through an in-depth description 
of a specific credit cooperative bank, the study clarifies how the Enterprise Risk 
Management system is practically shaped by business ethics.  On the other hand, this 
study contributes to the literature on ethical banks by providing an in-depth 
description of how such banks practically manage their risks in a holistic way and in 
explaining role of ERM in achieving their purposes, with particular reference to 
issues of financial exclusion. Moreover, in showing how the Enterprise Risk 
Management system helps credit cooperative banks to achieve their economic and 
social purposes, this research has some important implications in practice for similar 
banks in many countries which want to promote the economic growth of local 
communities. Indeed, the study sheds light on different aspects of ERM practices in 
each step of the holistic process for managing risks, often they are not related to the 
formal risk management procedures of the banks, but embedded in the ethical nature 
of the organization.  
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In the end, what should be noted is that given importance of the banking sector in 
ensuring the financial stability of the system as a whole, the issues highlighting the 
costant effort of international regulators to enhance the usefulness of risk reporting 
are of relevant interest. Also, the analisys, from an internal perspective, of the 
implementation of holistic systems for managing risk from an ethical dimension 
towards the achievement of the development of the global community should not be 
underestimated. Hence, the findings of this thesis have crucial implications also from 
a social perspective. Indeed, in providing a better understanding of the strategies of 
reporting and managing risk, the thesis represents an essential contribution also for 
context other than Italy. 
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